The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
238.
On 8 March,
the JIC reviewed existing sanctions on Iraq and assessed the
likely
impact of
“smarter sanctions”.133
239.
The review of
existing sanctions covered much the same ground as the
February
assessment.
240.
On smarter
sanctions, the JIC’s Key Judgements included:
•
It was
envisaged that smarter sanctions would:
{{focus on
military and dual-use items, and allow all civil
trade;
{{retain
UN control over oil revenue and bring oil smuggling under
those
controls;
and
{{enhance
border controls against prohibited trade.
•
“By
allowing all civil trade, smarter sanctions would give the US and
UK the
opportunity
to shift the
political debate away from
the humanitarian issue.” Iraq
argued for
“control of revenues as an issue of sovereignty”. Saddam
Hussein
would
“still seek to blame sanctions [for humanitarian problems] and
popular
Arab
opinion will remain susceptible to his propaganda. But he will find
it harder
to persuade
Arab governments and the wider international community
that
smarter
sanctions are to blame for the suffering of the Iraqi
people.”
•
“The
greatest
potential gains in terms of
cutting Saddam’s illicit revenue would
come
from curbing oil
smuggling.”
Neighbouring states would be likely to
demand
compensation for bringing trade under UN control. The income
lost
could be in
excess of US$1bn per year. Unless all routes were closed off,
a
reduction
in oil smuggling via one route was likely to be made up, at least
in part,
via
another.
•
Governments
in the region were “likely to
agree in principle to inspection of
border
crossings and trade in
return for free civil trade”. But this would be “hard
to sell”
and border controls would be difficult to implement
effectively.
241.
The JIC stated
that, if a smarter sanctions policy was adopted, Iraq would
still
try to
smuggle oil, evade the controls on military and dual-use imports,
and abuse the
OFF
programme. The “key battle
would be over political perceptions and hence
the
willingness
of regional governments to co-operate with other aspects of a
revised policy”.
242.
The JIC stated
that whatever agreements on inspections of border crossings
and
trade were
reached in principle, it was:
“…
unlikely
that border controls would be effective in practice.
A
comprehensive international border monitoring presence
would
be
required …
such monitoring would be
heavy on manpower and resources,
133
JIC
Assessment, 8 March 2001, ‘Iraq: Impact of Smarter
Sanctions’.
238