4.4 | The
search for WMD
“… agreed
that a restructured UNMOVIC/IAEA would represent the most
credible
way of
certifying elimination … While US private statements on
Blix/Baradei
[Dr Mohamed
ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA] have been harsh, we
have
seen
nothing to suggest the Administration would rule out the inspectors
returning
after a
period of time, without Blix, restructured, and in co-operation
with the
Coalition
(though the precise mechanics of the last will no doubt prompt
debate).
The time to
restructure/recruit could cover the period until Blix’s retirement
in June.”38
77.
Responding to
Mr Brenton on 16 April, the FCO stated that the UK agreed
with the
US on the
immediate next steps, and on the need for credible third-party
verification.39
The UK did
not want the future role of UNMOVIC to become a UK/US
problem.
Conditions
in Iraq were such that it could be argued the return of inspectors
was not
an issue.
The UK was happy to discuss options for verifying Coalition
discoveries, but
it was
important to keep in mind the need for credibility, and “what the
market will bear
in
New York”. UNMOVIC and the IAEA were the bodies likely to
carry most weight in
verifying
and validating Coalition finds. The UK would look at alternatives,
but they
must be
sufficiently credible not to be dismissed as US/UK stooges and
there were
“no obvious
candidates”.
78.
The FCO stated
that US officials had previously indicated that they were
“prepared
to consider
the verification/validation task being performed by a
‘restructured’ UNMOVIC
and INVO
[the IAEA’s Iraq Nuclear Verification Office]”. UNMOVIC’s
leadership also
needed to
change. Dr Blix had said he would not extend his contract when it
expired
in June.
79.
The FCO
believed that the type of restructuring it had in mind could take
place
“without
adjustment to UNMOVIC/INVO’s mandates”. It was:
“…
reluctant to offer more scope than absolutely necessary for others
to make
difficulties
for us in the Council. And, presentationally, it strikes us as an
own goal for
the
Coalition to start trying to re-write the very UNSCRs which we took
military action
to
uphold.”
80.
The FCO saw
“substantial practical advantages” in UNMOVIC and the
INVO
retaining
responsibility for the destruction of WMD, which “could be a
lengthy, hazardous
and very
expensive task”. There would also be a need to consider whether
long-term
monitoring
arrangements could be required.
81.
The FCO
concluded that “a successful intrusive inspection regime tailored
to
the
post-war Iraqi circumstances could be a useful precedent for
dealing with other
proliferators”.
38
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Manning, 17 April 2003,
‘Iraq: Role of UNMOVIC/IAEA’.
39
Telegram
168 FCO London to Washington, 16 April 2003, ‘US/Iraq: Role of
UNMOVIC’.
441