10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
758.
The official
also advised that there was a limit to the number of jobs that
could be
created in
the short to medium term and that “whilst more jobs may help to
divert some
energies
away from conflict, it will only be a small contributory factor to
reducing the
violence,
whose root causes are multifaceted”.
759.
Mr Brown
and Mr Browne made a joint visit to Baghdad on 11 June and
met
a number of
key individuals, including Prime Minister Maliki.439
Mr Brown
told Prime
Minister
Maliki that:
“… the UK
was keen to support the Prime Minister on changes to the
Constitution,
new laws
and reforms and economic infrastructure and support.”
760.
Sections 9.4
and 9.5 describe the sharp rise in sectarian violence after
the
bombing of
the al-Askari mosque in Samarra in February 2006.
761.
The
International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that the
violence
caused
hundreds of thousands of families
to flee their homes; displacement peaked
in June
2006 when over 16,000 families fled their homes.440
762.
A No.10
official sent Mr Blair a UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR)
update on
the situation on 1 December 2006.441
UNHCR
advised that approximately
425,000
Iraqi citizens had been internally displaced since the Samarra
bombing. In
total,
there were at least 1.6m Iraqi citizens displaced within Iraq and
between 1.6m and
1.8m Iraqi
refugees in the region; there were also 50,000 refugees from other
countries
in Iraq.
The needs of Internally Displaced People (IDPs), returnees,
refugees and their
host
communities were “dramatic and to a large extent
unmet”.
763.
On 11 January
2007, the British Embassy Baghdad reported that UNHCR
had
launched an
appeal for US$60m to meet the humanitarian needs of Iraqi
refugees
and IDPs in
2007.442
UNHCR
estimated that, of the 1.7m IDPs in Iraq, one million
had
been
displaced before 2003 and up to 490,000 since the Samarra bombing.
Obtaining
accurate
figures was difficult as many IDPs were living with extended family
or not
registering
with the Government. UNHCR expected that it would be difficult to
raise
funds from
donors, given Iraq’s budget surplus.
764.
At the 11
January meeting of DOP(I), Ministers commented that IDPs
were
“principally
an Iraqi Government responsibility – it should address the violence
and push
forward
reconciliation, and had the resources to address the needs of the
displaced”.443
439
Letter
Bowler to Banner, 13 June 2007, ‘The Chancellor and Defence
Secretary’s Visit to Baghdad’.
440
International
Organization for Migration, [undated], Iraq
Displacement 2007 Year in Review.
441
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 1 December 2006, ‘Iraq Update, 1
December’ attaching Paper,
[undated],
‘UNHCR Update on the Iraq Situation’.
442
eGram
1267/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 11 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Update on
the Situation with
Internally
Displaced People’.
443
Minutes, 11
January 2007, DOP(I) meeting.
319