9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
996.
To provide
some context for the debate, Lt Gen Fry sent a paper on
the
consequences
and risks of strategic failure in Iraq to Gen Walker, copied
to
997.
Lt Gen Fry
judged that failure in Iraq was so unthinkable to the US
Administration
that they
would “continue to provide sufficient force elements” to prevent
it. As a
consequence:
“The issue
of the UK acceding to the US request for extra support is
therefore
not considered
to be essential in mitigating the risk of circumstances leading
to
total withdrawal.”
998.
Lt Gen Fry
explained that whilst it was not likely that the US would allow a
security
vacuum to
develop if the UK did not take on the two additional provinces,
expanding the
UK sector
might allow US forces to re-deploy to the centre of Iraq. This
could “remove
some
sensitive Shia areas from the risk of purely kinetic solutions” by
US forces, and
allow the
“UK approach” to “help to improve Shia consent across a more
uniform area”.
999.
Lt Gen Fry
concluded:
“… we
consider that UK accession to the US requests for military support
will not,
in itself,
guarantee the achievement of SSC [Steady State Criteria] – even if
we
met those
requests in full. Nor can we say categorically that our refusal so
to do
will
seriously impede progress, or irrevocably fracture the Coalition.
The question
remains
more as to whether we can afford to take the risk of not doing so
with the
concomitant
chance of further deterioration, and failure to extract our forces
in the
medium or
long term.”
1000.
Gen Walker
told Lt Gen Fry that his paper had been “v helpful in focusing
minds
on this
issue”.
1001.
Mr Blair
held a meeting on 13 May to discuss security in
Iraq.566
Mr Hoon,
Mr John
Prescott (the Deputy Prime Minister), Mr Scarlett, Gen Walker,
Sir Michael Jay,
Lt Gen
Fry, Mr Powell, Sir Nigel Sheinwald and other No.10 and
Cabinet Office staff
were
present.
1002.
Mr Scarlett
explained that attacks against the Coalition (500 per week) were
less
frequent
than in April (when they had reached 800 per week) but
significantly higher than
the
position at the start of the year (200 per week). He said
that:
“Fallujah
was calm following the insertion of the Iraqi manned Fallujah
Brigade …
Attacks on
the oil terminals and pipelines posed a strategic threat, as did
sustained
disruption
of the main supply routes. In Najaf, Muqtada al-Sadr was isolated
and
565
Minute
DCDS(C) to PSO/CDS, 12 May 2004, ‘Strategic Failure in Iraq –
Consequences and Risks’
including
Manuscript comment Walker.
566
Letter
Bowen to Baker, 13 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Security’.
371