The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
961.
No.10
officials updated Mr Blair at his request on 15 March,
following press and
Parliamentary
interest in UK access to reconstruction contracts and the
involvement
of
Halliburton.413
Mr Blair
was informed that UK companies would be eligible for
subcontracted
work under the US$600m USAID contract and that Mr O’Brien
had
agreed to
send USAID a list of “trustworthy UK companies”, including those
with
experience
of contracting for the MOD, which might acquire security clearance
to bid for
primary
contracts. The briefing note made no mention of the US$7bn oil
repair contract.
962.
Government
lobbying on behalf of UK companies and the involvement of
UK
firms in
post-conflict reconstruction is addressed in Section
10.3.
963.
On 14
March, Mr Blair approved a proposal to extend the UK’s
AO
northwards
during Phase III if commanders on the ground judged it
sensible.
964.
Lt Gen Reith
sent the Chiefs of Staff an update on military planning options
on
10 March
(see Section 6.2).414
The update
reflected the Chiefs’ comments on Lt Gen
Reith’s two
papers of 4 March and his discussions with senior US commanders
between
5 and
7 March.
965.
Lt Gen Reith
recommended that the Joint Command be authorised to
operate
north of
the current planned UK AO, no further than al-Amara, “on the
understanding
that the
Division will only exploit forward as far as security and
transition to Phase IV
within the
current AO allows”.
966.
Lt Gen Reith
outlined the plan to extend the UK AO to the north at the Chiefs
of
Staff
meeting on 10 March.415
He stated
that the “current UK AO could potentially result
in enemy
forces around Basra interfering with Phase IV operations”. There
was “a clear
military
task to ensure that enemy forces in the areas outside the current
UK AO were
unable to
interfere with the UK Main Effort”.
967.
The Chiefs of
Staff were “concerned that extending the AO would
overstretch
Phase III
and Phase IV resources and potentially detract from the Main Effort
in the
UK AO”.
968.
Adm Boyce
directed Lt Gen Reith “to proceed with the main effort, of
an
exemplary
Phase IV, in the original AO (Southern AO) with operations in the
Northern
AO as
required to achieve a speedy and successful Phase III and to shape
Phase IV”.
413
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 15 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction
Contracts’.
414
Minute
Reith to COSSEC, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq – Military Planning Options
Update’ attaching
Paper CJO,
10 March 2003, ‘Iraq military planning options – an
update’.
415
Minutes, 10
March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
486