The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

few months but, in practice, the UK would have to continue to support the ISG until

Mr Duelfer was ready to produce his report.

778.  The Op ROCKINGHAM weekly update for 2 to 7 April stated that deteriorating

security in Baghdad and Basra was affecting ISG operational planning.434 A shortage

of vehicles with armoured protection was complicating efforts to complete outstanding

collection activities before the end of June.

779.  On 13 May, Mr Howard wrote to Mr Scarlett about the future of the ISG.435 He

advised that the ISG still had much work to complete, including collection activities at

suspect sites, interviews of HVDs, and analysis of millions of documents. Its ability to

continue those tasks after 30 June was uncertain and future command and control

arrangements were in a state of “flux”.

780.  Mr Howard reported that Mr Duelfer expected to “produce a detailed report” in the

late summer/early autumn. While that would “not necessarily draw the line underneath

the question of WMD in Iraq” it was “likely to make provisional conclusions”. That would

“almost certainly signify in the public mind the ‘final word’ from the ISG on Iraq WMD”.

781.  After the transfer of sovereignty on 30 June, the ISG would focus increasingly

on analysis of Iraq’s intentions and future WMD programmes, and decision-making

in Saddam Hussein’s regime. The report was “unlikely to focus on whether Iraq has

disarmed, which was of course UNMOVIC’s focus”.

782.  Mr Howard also wrote that:

• The ISG was “likely to survive” to deal with other tasks after the release of its

“final report” on WMD.

• The UK had “benefited considerably” from having the ISG Deputy Commander

post.

• Deteriorating security in Iraq had impeded the ISG’s effectiveness. The UK

continued to fulfil its duty of care to staff and would monitor closely the post-

transfer of sovereignty security situation.

783.  At No.10’s request, Mr Dowse prepared an update on the ISG on 21 May.436

784.  Mr Dowse covered much the same ground as Mr Howard. He wrote:

• ISG planning since March had been hampered significantly by poor security

throughout Iraq, high staff turnover, difficulty in filling posts and some equipment

shortages.

• A major part of current ISG activity was “combating the efforts of insurgent

networks to develop and use chemical weapons against Coalition forces”.

434  Op ROCKINGHAM Weekly No.41, 2-7 April 2004.

435  Letter Howard to Scarlett, 13 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Future of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG)’.

436  Minute Dowse to Quarrey, 21 May 2004, ‘Iraq Survey Group’.

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