10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
1022.
Mr Rycroft
outlined how Mr Blair thought existing activity could be
improved,
including
by:
“(a)
Iraqi-isation. We must do whatever it takes to get the ICDC [Iraqi
Civil Defence
Corps] and
Iraqi police into shape. Every main road has to be guarded,
oil
refineries
rebuilt, electricity generation on target …
(b)
Communications. There needs to be a concerted campaign in Iraq and
abroad
to explain
what the security problem actually is, and how it is a
deliberate
attempt to
prevent the Iraqi people from getting the benefit of what we are
doing.
We need to
provide top security for Al Iraqiya’s reporters and staff;
strengthen
the
Coalition’s Arabic media capability; improve the coordination
between military
and
political to give real time information to spokesmen; and vastly
improve the
Iraqi
Government’s communications capability.
(c)
Reconstruction spending. There is a damaging gap between
‘obligated’ funds
and actual
spending. Any suspension of … projects must be temporary. We
need
urgent
clarity and agreement on what will replace the CPA outside Baghdad
after
30
June.”
1023.
On the same
day, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent Dr Rice another Note from
Mr Blair,
and asked
her to show it to President Bush before their video conference the
next day.599
In his
Note, Mr Blair set out the detailed analysis that
Mr Rycroft had communicated
across
Whitehall, including the need for:
•
“a vast
uplift in the Iraqi Government’s capability to
communicate”;
•
“a massive,
concerted campaign” to explain the security problem: Mr Blair
said
that he
would “like to send a couple of people I really trust to give a
proper sense
of what
could be done”; and
•
“a
‘whatever it takes’ attitude to ensure that obligated funds were
spent”.
1024.
Mr Blair
spoke to President Bush on 27 April.600
The discussion
focused on
security,
the presence of Coalition Forces after the transition, and the
political process.
They
discussed the need for the reconstruction process to continue while
the Coalition
resolved
the security situation. Mr Blair also highlighted the
importance of continuing to
make
progress on the Iraqi media.
1025.
In mid-April,
the US had requested that the UK send additional troops to Iraq
(see
Section
9.2).
599
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 26 April 2004, [untitled], attaching Note [Blair
to Bush], [undated], ‘Note’.
600
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 27 April 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with Bush, 27
April: Iraq’.
177