4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
597.
The Iraq
Inquiry has drawn on the evidence offered to those Inquiries, and
their
analysis
and conclusions, in reaching a view on the aspects of the dossier
addressed
in the
following paragraphs.
598.
During the
drafting of the dossier, questions were raised by staff in the
DIS
about the
basis for the judgements on Iraq’s chemical and biological
weapons
capabilities
and its intent to use chemical and biological weapons.
599.
The DIS
comments on the draft dossier on 17 September, expressing
concerns
that some
of the statements on chemical and biological weapons in the draft
could not
be
substantiated by the intelligence seen by the DIS, which were
discussed in Mr Miller’s
meeting
that morning, are set out earlier in this Section.
600.
Mr Miller
confirmed that no minute was taken of the meeting.326
601.
Mr Scarlett
told the Hutton Inquiry that the DIS comments had been
discussed
by the
formal drafting group on 17 September and that:
“They were
dealt with within that process and they were not brought forward by
the
DIS senior
management to the level of the JIC.”327
602.
Mr Cragg
told the Hutton Inquiry that, at the meeting on 17 September, “it
was
agreed that
the SIS representative would make further representations” to the
DIS
about the
“very tightly held intelligence [the report of 11 September]” and
that the SIS
representative
had spoken to Dr Paul Roper, DIS Director of Science and
Technology,
and told
him that “SIS believed it was good intelligence”.328
603.
Mr Cragg
told Lord Hutton that it was reported to him that the concern
about
the
discontinuity between the main text of the dossier and the
Executive Summary
had been:
“… put …
down to the fact that the Executive Summary pulled together or
reflected
not merely
recent intelligence which was … contained in the main text, but
also
the general
context of the new intelligence which had been received, such as
the
knowledge,
which we had had for many years, of the capabilities of the Iraqis
in their
use of
chemical weapons and also our knowledge that they had commander
control
arrangements
for the use of these weapons in place.”329
604.
Mr Scarlett
subsequently told the Hutton Inquiry that, after the
meeting
on 17
September, Mr Miller had reported the DIS concerns about the
statements
on the
production of “CW agent”, because it related to “the existence of
additional
326
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 11 August 2003, page 160.
327
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 23 August 2003, page 67.
328
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 15 September 2003, pages
37-38.
329
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 15 September 2003, page 27.
229