6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
the
perception of legitimacy that the current narrow Coalition lacks.
But realistically,
current
ill-feeling may run deep enough to prevent a thaw …
“… Lt Gen
Abizaid would like to avoid an occupation model based on sectors
as
used in the
Balkans … I observed that a territorial solution may be difficult
to avoid
as nations
would wish to influence a given sector and military commanders
would
want clear
boundaries for operations and interaction with civil authorities
…
“… I judge
that, realistically, it will be some time before Coalition partners
join US
and British
forces in any real strength, if at all. I draw two conclusions from
this:
first, that
as much as possible of Iraq’s administrative and military structure
should
be
preserved; and second, that we should beware rapid US drawdown on
the
American
assumption that UK (perhaps through the ARRC) will form the focus
for
an international
force that in the event fails to materialise.
“… GOC 1
Div [Maj Gen Brims] made it clear to me that in clarifying his role
in
Phase IV,
he needed simply to know what his title was, to whom he would
be
responsible,
and how quickly a civil administrator would be appointed. While
he
judges that
Basra has adequate short-term food stocks, it will urgently need
water,
electricity
and medical supplies … Only the ICRC has humanitarian stocks
in
position …
there was little confidence within 1 Div that DFID has a coherent
plan
in place. I
support GOC 1 Div’s intent to manage Phase IV with as light a touch
as
possible,
but it will be important to establish the rule of law quickly – the
question,
as in
Kosovo, will be whose law? …”
867.
Gen Jackson
concluded:
“We are
ready not just to demonstrate solidarity with our Coalition
partner, but to
contribute
considerable and potentially decisive combat power to achieve
rapid
success in
Phase III. Rapid success will set the conditions for Phase IV,
which
in turn
will determine the overall success of the enterprise.”
868.
A “Critical
Decision Checklist” prepared for Mr Hoon on 7 March
listed
actions
that had to be taken before UK forces were committed to action,
including
provision
of resources for immediate humanitarian assistance.
869.
DFID and
the MOD remained unable to agree a joint approach to
UK
humanitarian
operations in the area occupied by UK forces.
870.
On 7 March,
Mr Lee prepared a “Critical Decision Checklist” for
Mr Hoon, listing
actions
that “have to be taken before forces could be committed to
action”.363
Three
were
linked to
post-conflict planning:
•
“Provision
of resources for immediate humanitarian assistance (in
hand)”;
363
Minute Lee
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 7 March 2003, ‘Critical Decision
Checklist’.
469