The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
US and UK
strategies for Iraq began to diverge almost immediately after
the
conflict.
Although the differences were managed, by early 2007 the UK
was
finding it
difficult to play down the divergence, which was, by that point,
striking.
•
The UK
missed clear opportunities to reconsider its military approach
in
Multi‑National
Division (South‑East).
•
Throughout
2004 and 2005, it appears that senior members of the
Armed
Forces
reached the view that little more would be achieved in MND(SE) and
that
it would
make more sense to concentrate military effort on Afghanistan where
it
might have
greater effect.
•
From July
2005 onwards, decisions in relation to resources for Iraq were
made
under the
influence of the demands of the UK effort in Afghanistan. Although
Iraq
remained
the stated UK main effort, the Government no longer had the option
of
a
substantial reinforcement of its forces there.
•
The UK’s
plans to reduce troop levels depended on the transition of
lead
responsibility
for security to the Iraqi Security Forces, even as the latter’s
ability
to take on
that responsibility was in question.
•
The UK
spent time and energy on rewriting strategies, which tended to
describe
a desired
end state without setting out how it would be reached.
•
UK forces
withdrew from Iraq in 2009 in circumstances which did not
meet
objectives
defined in January 2003.
817.
The following
key findings are from Section 10.4, and relate to evidence
in
Sections
10.1 to 10.3:
•
The UK
failed to plan or prepare for the major reconstruction
programme
required in
Iraq.
•
Reconstruction
was the third pillar in a succession of UK strategies for
Iraq.
The
Government never resolved how reconstruction would support
broader
UK objectives.
•
Following
the resignation of Ms Clare Short, the International
Development
Secretary,
and the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1483 in May
2003,
DFID
assumed leadership of the UK’s reconstruction effort in Iraq. DFID
would
subsequently
define, within the framework established by the Government,
the
scope and
nature of that effort.
•
At key
points, DFID should have considered strategic questions about the
scale,
focus and
purpose of the UK’s reconstruction effort in Iraq.
•
The US‑led
Coalition Provisional Authority excluded the UK from
discussions
on oil
policy and on disbursements from the Development Fund for
Iraq.
•
Many of the
failures which affected pre‑invasion planning and
preparation
persisted
throughout the post‑conflict period. They included
poor
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