The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
17.
Mr Straw
was also concerned that others in the Security Council wanted
an
approach
which would “make it politically impossible to take military
action”. It would
be “crucial
to avoid both traps”.
18.
Addressing the
substance of the issues, Mr Straw wrote that “our own
emerging
thinking
and that of the US is converging” and the US and UK should seek a
resolution
which:
•
determined
that Iraq had been and was “now in material breach of a …
series
of
obligations to the Security Council”. That was “designed to provide
the
necessary
legal cover”;
•
demanded
“unfettered access for inspectors, with clear deadlines as a first
test
of Iraqi
acceptance and a more intrusive mandate”; and
•
included
“some provisions on what happens if Iraq fails to comply with
the
specific
requirements”, but “falling short of authorising ‘all necessary
measures’”.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, UK Permanent Representative to the UN in New
York,
judged that
was “simply a non‑starter” with China, France and
Russia.
19.
Mr Straw
provided “an illustrative draft” resolution, which reflected
initial discussions
with the US
but had not been shown to them.
20.
The draft
included elements from each of the options offered by the FCO
on
6 September
(see Section 3.4). Mr Straw identified a number of issues that
would
require
political judgements:
•
The
advantages and disadvantages of the US proposal to challenge
Iraq
to produce
a full declaration of its WMD holdings very quickly.
Mr Straw
thought
that was “a bad idea” and that there were “better ways of setting
early
deadlines”.
•
How much
tougher an agreed inspection regime could be without
making
demands
which would not be agreed by either the members of the
Security
Council or
Iraq. The US was “thinking of a provision which would allow [Dr]
Blix
to decide
what further access he needed to achieve his mandate”. That
“would
mean
jettisoning previously agreed special arrangements (like exemption
of
palaces
etc)”. That “would be difficult to negotiate” and Mr Straw did
not want
Iraq to
reject the resolution because it “could be said to move the
goalposts”;
but he
favoured trying the approach.
•
How clear
the resolution could be about the consequences in the event
of
non‑compliance.
That would be “the hardest‑fought point in the
Security
Council”.
As “all necessary measures” looked “unnegotiable”, and the
US
would
“adamantly oppose a requirement” for a further resolution, the
current
US
preference was “to stipulate that any failure to comply with the
provisions
of the resolution
would constitute a further material breach and that Iraq
would
be
responsible for the serious consequences of that”. Mr Straw
took the view
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