The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
15.
Ms Lindy
Cameron, Deputy Head of DFID Baghdad from January to
November
2004 (and
subsequently Head of DFID Baghdad), described the
transition:
“… it’s
hard to describe how strange the CPA was. So in a sense this period
in
June/July
2004 when we were transitioning from the CPA to … an Iraqi
Government
that was
then sovereign, was a real transition because it is difficult to
imagine how
strange it
was to be in a building of thousands and thousands of foreign
officials
effectively
running a country, and then a very rapid transition from that to an
Iraqi
Government
which had some of the structures it needed, but then didn’t have
some
16.
On 1 July, at
his request, the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)
provided
General Sir
Michael Walker, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), with advice
on
post‑transition
plans for infrastructure reconstruction.4
•
The US
Project and Contracting Office (PCO) would be the largest source
of
funding for
reconstruction in the short to medium term, but was still
developing
its
management structures and procedures and recruiting staff. It was
likely that
the PCO
would not be fully functioning until September. Concerns had
been
expressed
about a funding gap over the summer and the consequent
potential
for “social
unrest”. MND(SE) had explored the possibility of extending
CPA
projects or
increasing the US Commanders’ Emergency Response
Programme
(CERPs)
allocation for the South, but neither option appeared
possible.
Ambassador
Bremer had requested that additional UK resources should
be
used to
plug the potential gap between CPA and PCO activity.
•
Since the
emphasis in Iraq had shifted from reconstruction to development,
the
bulk of the
UK’s future contribution clearly fell “within the competence of
DFID”.
•
The
Essential Services Plan, which had been due to complete by 30
June
2004 but
had now been extended to August, remained the “major vehicle
for
infrastructure
reconstruction” in MND(SE).
•
The UK
military would continue to implement projects funded by the US
CERPs
and UK
allocations for Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).
18.
The 1 July
meeting of the AHMGIR considered three papers on UK priorities for
the
period up
to the Iraqi elections (scheduled for January 2005), on the
political process,
security,
and reconstruction and development.5
3
Public
hearing, 22 June 2010, pages 12-13.
4
Minute
CivSec PJHQ to PSO/CDS, 1 July 2004, ‘Infrastructure Reconstruction
at Transition’.
5 Annotated
Agenda, 1 July 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
200