3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
362.
Mr Campbell
advised Mr Blair that a statement would be needed early
in
the New
Year bringing all the strands of the strategy on Iraq together to
set out
the UK
Government’s position and to counter the sense that the UK was
acting
for America.
363.
Mr Campbell
suggested that the statement should communicate the
“big
picture”
and provide the basis for addressing difficult questions: Why Iraq?
Why
now? And
why us? That should include the UK’s definition of material
breach.
364.
Mr John
Williams had written to Mr Campbell on 2 December in
response to a
request for
“strategic public objectives on Iraq, setting out our aims, and
working through
the
difficult issues”.129
Mr Williams
provided two papers, one on “Public Objectives” for
public use
and one on “Media Tactics”. Both had been approved by
Mr Straw.
365.
The paper on
“public objectives” drew on the strategic objectives
agreed
by Mr Blair
and sent to Ministers on 22 October (see Section 3.5).
366.
Production of
a document setting out the UK objectives and the need to be
more
“in control
of the agenda” was discussed at meeting of an Iraq Strategy Group
chaired
by
Mr Campbell on 10 December and subsequently.130
367.
In response to
Mr Blair’s request of 16 December, Mr Campbell wrote
to
Mr Blair on
19 December setting out the need to explain the UK’s strategy
and
seeking Mr Blair’s
views.131
368.
Mr Campbell
wrote: “Iraq is moving up a gear as an issue and as we enter
the
New Year
we need to step up our communications efforts.”
369.
Mr Campbell
recommended that the objectives approved in October should
be
published
as soon as Parliament returned on 7 January, with a statement in
the House
of Commons
from Mr Blair alongside publicity generated by the FCO Heads
of Mission
Conference.
The statement would set out the strategic framework for the
Government’s
overall
approach and draw together the diplomatic, political and
humanitarian strands
of the
strategy on Iraq as well as addressing issues of proliferation and
terrorism.
It would
“give us all the big picture to communicate and give us a handle
for the difficult
questions as
we go”.
129
Email
Williams to Campbell, 2 December 2002, ‘Strategy Note’ attaching
Paper, ‘Public Objectives’ and
Paper,
‘Media Tactics’.
130
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
131
Minute
Campbell to Prime Minister, 19 December 2002, ‘Re: Iraq
Communications’.
67