The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
336.
Also in
November, Secretary Rumsfeld ordered Major General Karl
Eikenberry,
former US
Security Co‑ordinator and Chief of the Office of Military
Co‑operation in
Afghanistan,
to assess what reforms were necessary to produce enough capable
Iraqi
forces to
take over security responsibilities.297
His report,
published in February 2004,
is
described later in this Section.
337.
In December
2003, the CPA produced a plan to achieve the accelerated
timetable
for
transfer of authority by the end of June 2004.298
338.
The plan
included a section on security which stated that to meet the
accelerated
timeline,
the following changes were required:
•
an
accelerated stand‑up of the IMOD and the National Command
Authority;
•
accelerated
development of internal security capabilities in the
MOI
(Anti‑Terrorist
Branch, criminal intelligence);
•
a focus on
anti‑corruption capacity‑building; and
•
accelerated
recruitment, training and deployment of Iraqi Security
Forces.
339.
The plan also
described two key security policy decisions that were
required,
as identified
by CPA staff:
“First, the
development of a holistic approach to the Iraqi security sector,
including
clarification
of ICDC missions and interface with other security elements.
Second,
decisions
on the integration of former militias into security forces and on
militia
demobilization.”
340.
On 4 December,
the CPA Office of Policy Planning and Analysis produced a
paper
entitled
‘Iraq: Integrated Security Sector Development’.299
It was an
assessment of the
current
situation and plans, the desired position and a consideration of
what thinking and
action was
required by the CPA and CJTF‑7 to achieve the desired
position.
341.
It is the
first assessment the Inquiry has seen that attempted to articulate
all SSR
plans in
one paper and consider how they interacted. The executive summary
explained
that the
paper benefited from detailed input by security sector experts in
both CPA and
CJTF‑7.
342.
The paper
described the CPA‑defined end state for security in Iraq
as:
“•
there is a
secure environment for people and property that enables
citizens
to participate
fully in political and economic life;
297
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
298
Coalition
Provisional Authority, 2 December 2003, ‘Towards Transition in
Iraq: Building Sustainability’.
299
Paper CPA,
4 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Integrated Security Sector
Development’.
132