6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
358.
A revised
version, modified to reflect developments in US thinking on
post-Saddam
Hussein
Iraq, was sent to Principals by Dr Rice on 29 October. The
document, published
in
War and
Decision, the memoir
of Mr Douglas Feith, US Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy
2001-2005, stated the need to:
“Demonstrate
that the US and Coalition partners are prepared to play a
sustained
role in
providing security, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction aid
in support
359.
The document
was not shown to the UK until 31 January 2003 (see Section
6.5).
360.
The US made
a number of organisational changes to implement the
goals
approved by
President Bush on 29 August.
361.
Hard
Lessons records that
the US took a number of steps to help implement the
goals
approved by President Bush on 29 August:
•
The Joint
Staff in the Pentagon instructed CENTCOM to start planning
to
administer
Iraq for an interim period after an invasion.
•
Mr Feith
enlarged the office in the Pentagon responsible for policy planning
in
Iraq in a
new Office of Special Plans.
•
Dr Rice
established an NSC Executive Steering Group on Iraq, chaired
by
Mr Miller,
to “jump-start” post-conflict planning across the US
government.
•
Inter-agency
working groups responsible for energy, diplomacy,
global
communications
and humanitarian issues were established under the
umbrella
of the
Executive Steering Group.209
362.
The
inter-agency Humanitarian Working Group was set up in
September.210
It
was
headed by
Mr Elliot Abrams, NSC Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights
and
International
Organizations, and Mr Robin Cleveland, Associate Director of the
White
House
Office of Management and Budget. Membership included
representatives of the
Joint Staff
and the Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, Justice and
Commerce,
and the US
Agency for International Development (USAID). It was USAID’s first
formal
involvement
in the Iraq planning process.
363.
The
Humanitarian Working Group focused on the response to
large-scale
humanitarian
contingencies, including the possible use of WMD by Saddam
Hussein.
It also
considered the administration of revenue generated under OFF,
liaised with the
international
aid community to identify critical civilian infrastructure for a
military
“no-strike”
list and began to assess the demands of post-war
reconstruction.
208
Feith
DJ. War and
Decision. Harper,
2008.
209
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
210
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
173