6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
the first
tasks would be to put Iraq’s debt on an agreed international
footing. DFID would
aim, with
the Treasury, “to play a lead role in the IFIs in gaining such an
agreement”.
850.
Dr Brewer sent
Sir David Manning supplementary material for Mr Blair to use
with
President
Bush, which explained the need for a resolution to authorise
reconstruction
activity
and the financial advantage of having one.357
Dr Brewer
explained that the draft
speaking
note had been seen by Ms Short, Mr Chakrabarti,
Mr Chilcott (in Mr Ricketts’
absence)
and Mr Bowen. She concluded:
“We judge
that the time to press our case with the Americans is now: they
need to
know how
much this matters for us and for the prospects of others engaging
in the
reconstruction
effort.”
851.
The suggested
points for Mr Blair to put to President Bush
included:
•
the
constraints on occupying forces in the absence of a resolution
expressly
authorising
a continued international presence in Iraq; and
•
the
negative impact the absence of a resolution was having on planning
by large
parts of
the international system.
852.
The DFID draft
included the suggestion that Mr Blair conclude with the
statement:
“That
apart, I need this UN mandate before I can give the
go-ahead.”
853.
Sir David
Manning forwarded Dr Brewer’s letter to Mr Blair on 8 March,
with the
comment:
“You will
need to engage Bush on this soon – but my view is that we
should
concentrate
on 2nd Resolution this w/e [the weekend of 8 and 9 March] and
start
on the
UN heavy lifting on Monday/Tuesday [10 and 11
March].”358
854.
Mr Blair
discussed the need for a further resolution on post-conflict Iraq
with
President
Bush on 12 March.
855.
The second
report by the DIS Red Team stated that internal Iraqi support
was
likely to
be the single most important factor in achieving success in
Iraq.
856.
The Red
Team recommended that, if there was any doubt about
the
Coalition’s
ability to meet Iraqi expectations in an exemplary fashion,
steps
should be
taken as soon as possible to lower those expectations.
357
Letter
Brewer to Manning, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq/Post
Conflict: Legal and Financial Imperatives’ attaching
Paper
[unattributed], 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq/Post Conflict: Legal and
Financial Imperatives: Points for the
Prime
Minister to use with President Bush’.
358
Manuscript
comment Manning to Prime Minister, 8 March 2003, on Letter Brewer
to Manning,
7 March 2003,
‘Iraq/Post Conflict: Legal and Financial Imperatives’.
465