The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
number of
issues still to be resolved, organised under five headings:
security; relief and
reconstruction;
political; economic; and environmental.
103.
Under the
relief and reconstruction heading, the paper stated that the UK
would
like the
OFF programme, funded by Iraqi oil revenues, to continue to meet
humanitarian
needs in
the post-conflict period. Its ability to do so would depend on the
extent of
the
disruption caused by any conflict. Looking further ahead, the OFF
programme
was not
designed to support reconstruction. The extent of external funding
required
for
reconstruction would depend on Iraqi oil revenues, UN compensation
claims and
external
debt obligations. The UK would be able to provide only a limited
contribution
to “total
costs”. There might be scope for Iraq to borrow against future oil
revenues to
finance
reconstruction.
104.
Under the
economic heading, the paper stated that a key task would be
to
maximise
Iraq oil revenues, consistent with the effect on the global market.
The Coalition
would need
to consider whether that was best achieved by returning control of
Iraqi oil
exports
from an international civilian administration to an Iraqi
administration rapidly or
in slower
time. The Coalition would also need to consider how the competing
calls on
oil revenues
of debt repayment and reconstruction should be
balanced.
105.
Under the
environmental heading, the paper asked whether there was
an
environmental
clean-up plan.
106.
On 20 January,
President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive
24,
consolidating
all post-conflict activity in the new DoD-owned Office of
Reconstruction
and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).55
President
Bush had decided in principle to
place the
DoD in charge of all post-conflict activity in December
2002.
107.
Lieutenant
General (retired) Jay Garner was appointed to lead
ORHA.56
108.
The British
Embassy Washington reported on the outcome of the 22 January
talks
on
post-conflict planning:
“Overall,
US Day After planning is still lagging far behind military
planning.
But they
have agreed to two working groups: on the UN dimension; and
on
economic
reconstruction issues …
…
“The US
were clear that the OFF [programme] would have to be
maintained.
There would
need to be debt rescheduling. There were many questions to
be
resolved on
oil production and revenues. The US fully accepted the need
for
55
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office,
2009.
56
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office,
2009.
390