The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
605.
Dr Kay gave a
number of briefings to US media before his testimony to the
Senate
Armed
Services Committee on 28 January.
606.
In an
interview for Reuters
shortly after
his resignation, widely reported in the UK
media, Dr
Kay stated:
“I don’t
think they [WMD] existed. What everyone was talking about is
stockpiles
produced
after the end of the last Gulf War and I don’t think there was a
large-scale
production
program in the nineties.”332
607.
The UK media
also gave extensive coverage to comments by Secretary
Powell
on
24 January, including that it was an “open question” whether
Iraq held any
608.
Speaking
on BBC
Television’s
Breakfast with
Frost, Mr Kennedy
said:
“The more
that we see the absence of weapons of mass destruction, the more
we
see both
the Prime Minister and the President of the United States qualify
what it is
that the
Iraq Survey Group may or may not uncover.”334
609.
Mr Rycroft
spoke to the White House to underline the difficulties Secretary
Powell’s
comments
were causing in the UK.335
Dr Rice
urged that, as soon as possible, all public
comments
should refer back to resolution 1441: Saddam Hussein had WMD, had
used
them in the
past and had obligations to destroy them. Resolution 1441 had given
him a
final
opportunity to comply with his international obligations, which he
had failed to take.
610.
In an
interview for The New York
Times published on
25 January, Dr Kay said that
Iraq had
been “a dangerous place” with the ability to produce WMD, terrorist
groups
“passing
through” and no central control.336
But the CIA
had missed signs of the “chaos”
in the
Iraqi regime that had corrupted Iraq’s weapons capabilities. Iraqi
scientists
and
documents had revealed that Iraq had also been far more concerned
about UN
inspections
than Washington had ever realised.
611.
Mr Rycroft
discussed Iraqi WMD with Mr Hadley on
26 January.337
Mr Rycroft
set
out the
timetable for the Hutton Inquiry and “underlined the sensitivities
of any US public
comments
particularly during this period”. The US and UK should keep in
“very close
step” over
their responses to growing calls in both countries for full public
inquiries into
332
BBC
News,
24 January 2004, US chief
Iraq arms expert quit;
The
Guardian,
24 January 2004,
New WMD
blow for Blair.
333
BBC
News,
25 January 2004, Powell
casts doubt on Iraq WMDs.
334
BBC
News,
25 January 2004, Blair
stands firm over WMD.
335
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 25 January 2004, ‘Iraq: WMD: Conversation
with Rice, Hadley, Bartlett, Fried,
24 January’.
336
The New
York Times,
25 January 2004, The
Struggle for Iraq: Intelligence; Ex-Inspector Says CIA
Missed
Disarray in Iraqi Arms Program.
337
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 26 January 2004, ‘Iraqi WMD: Conversation
with Hadley’.
544