4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
•
… growing
suspicions and concerns underlying JIC Assessments
between
1995 and
1998 of Iraq’s chemical, biological and ballistic missile
capabilities,
which were
exacerbated and reinforced by Iraqi prevarication, concealment
and
14.
The Butler
Report added that it had detected “signs that this context led to
the JIC
making its
estimates of Iraqi capabilities on an over-cautious or worst case
basis” but
that was
“not always declared as such”.
15.
The Butler
Report also concluded that there were “differences in the quality
of the
assessments
carried out by the JIC” and contrasted the quality of the JIC
Assessments
of Iraq’s
nuclear capability during that time with those on chemical and
biological
16.
On nuclear
capabilities, the Butler Report stated that it had:
“… been
impressed by intelligence assessments … They were generally
thorough;
drew fully
on both open and secret material; brought together human and
technical
intelligence;
offered a view where appropriate on the quality of the
underlying
intelligence
sources; were balanced and measured; identified explicitly those
areas
where
previous assessments had been wrong, and the reasons why, to
correct
the record;
and at each significant stage included consideration of
alternative
hypotheses
and scenarios, and provided an explanation of the consequences
were
any to
arise, to aid readers’ understanding.”
17.
In relation to
the Assessments on chemical and biological weapons, the
Butler
Report
recognised that assessments were:
“…
intrinsically more difficult, and that analysis draws on different
intelligence
techniques.
We are conscious in particular that, because chemical and
biological
weapons
programmes can draw heavily on ‘dual use’ materials, it is easier
for a
proliferating
state to keep its programmes covert. The intelligence community
will
also have
had in mind that Iraq had used its chemical weapons in the past,
and was
engaged in
a sustained programme to try to deceive United Nations inspectors
and
to conceal
from them evidence of its prohibited programmes. Even so, we
have
found JIC
Assessments in these areas less assured. Our impression is that
they
were less
complete, especially in their considerations of alternative
hypotheses;
used a
different ‘burden of proof’ in testing Iraqi declarations; and
hence inclined
towards
over-cautious or worst case estimates, carrying with them a greater
sense
of
suspicion and an accompanying propensity to
disbelieve.”
3
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
207.
4
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraphs
208-209.
11