1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
611.
On
11 November, Mr Annan issued a press statement containing
a personal appeal
to Saddam
Hussein to take the necessary steps for a diplomatic solution to
the crisis.245
It
expressed “surprise” at Iraq’s decision when the Security Council
had “agreed a way
forward on
a comprehensive review”.
612.
Mr Blair
wrote in his memoir that Saddam Hussein had “thrown out the
weapons
inspectors,
who had written a damming report on the outstanding issues
relating
to weapons
of mass destruction and Saddam’s continuing ambitions to develop
a
programme
for them” and “President Clinton was contemplating a military
strike”.246
At a
meeting with Mr Robertson, Mr Cook and General Sir
Charles Guthrie, Chief of
the Defence
Staff, on 11 November, Mr Blair had been briefed on the
military options.
Cabinet had
been taken through the issue the following day, with
Mr Robertson warning
that it was
“the most serious development” since the Gulf
Conflict.
613.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Robertson had told Cabinet that Saddam Hussein
had
broken the
cease-fire agreement, broken his word to Mr Annan, and was
rebuilding
chemical
and biological weapons programmes.247
He was
weaponising nerve
agents.
These were “ferocious weapons” and “his neighbours believe there is
intent”.
Mr Campbell
wrote: “TB made clear this was the US demanding and us complying,
but
that our
own independent judgement was that he [Saddam Hussein] must be
forced to
comply. He
said there was a real breach, not a technical breach.”
614.
On
12 November, the Iraqi Permanent Representative to the UN in
New York was
given a
private warning that, if Iraq did not return to full compliance
very quickly it would
face a
substantial military strike.248
615.
Following
discussions in the Security Council in which “all the members
…
expressed
preference for a diplomatic solution”, Mr Annan wrote to
Saddam Hussein
on
13 November asking for “an early response” to the appeal in
his press statement
of 11 November,
which had been “unanimously endorsed” by the Security
Council.249
616.
Mr Aziz’s
response on 14 November stated that Iraq had put its trust in
Mr Annan
and his
good faith but, because of US objections, the deliberations of the
Security
Council on
the procedures for the comprehensive review had not provided a
clear
picture.250
On the
basis of Mr Annan’s appeal and messages from Russia,
China,
France,
Brazil and other States, Iraq had “decided to resume working with
the Special
Commission
and the IAEA and to allow them to perform their normal duties”. He
also
245
UN Security
Council, 14 November 1998, ‘Letter dated 13 November 1998
from the Secretary-General
addressed
to the President of the Republic of Iraq’
(S/1998/1077).
246
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
247
Campbell A
& Stott R. The Blair
Years: Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries.
Hutchinson, 2007.
248
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
16 November 1998, column 609.
249
UN Security
Council, 14 November 1998, ‘Letter dated 13 November 1998
from the Secretary-General
addressed
to the President of the Republic of Iraq’
(S/1998/1077).
250
UN Security
Council, 14 November 1998, ‘Annex II’
(S/1998/1077).
139