The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

301. A media plan that would change attitudes in the UK and US was needed.

Mr Powell advised Mr Blair to strengthen his relationship with Prime Minister Maliki,

keeping in more regular and relaxed contact.

302. Mr Powell concluded his minute:

“But there is also a bigger question … If this were a domestic problem we would

use the whole team to strategise about it. Maybe you should try a discussion in that

format to see if we could find a better way of communicating what we are trying to

do. It may be that we think about Iraq in too technocratic and in an insufficiently

political way.”

303. Mr Blair commented: “I agree. I should see Maliki in December and maybe

do weekly video cons … We also need some good news balance. And the key is to

revitalise the Compact plan.”166

304. Following a discussion in the Iraq Strategy Group, a draft of the Forward Plan was

sent to Mr Blair’s Private Secretary by Mr McDonald on 24 November.167 It was sent in

parallel to the FCO, the MOD and to SIS.

305. In his covering note, Mr McDonald set out the assumptions which underpinned

the Plan. They included diminishing UK influence over “events” in Iraq and that the

Iraqi Government increasingly saw the coalition as the main obstacle to establishing its

authority. As a consequence responsibility would be handed over ahead of a rigorous

assessment that they were capable of undertaking the task.

306. The draft plan also assumed that there would not be a fundamental change of US

policy as a result of the Iraq Study Group’s report.

307. The plan included proposed actions under three headings:

• Political accommodation. The UK should help bring about a political compact

based on a declaration of fundamental principles, the establishment of a Peace

Commission and a Reconciliation/Rehabilitation Commission and agreement to

a date for Provincial Elections in 2007.

• Governance and economic development. The UK should urge Prime Minister

Maliki to build greater Iraqi capability by establishing an Economic Task

Force equivalent to the Ministerial Committee on National Security, securing

agreement on the Hydrocarbons Law;168 pushing for a “full and effective

multilateral presence in Iraq”; and securing early deals on oil revenue sharing

and fiscal federalism.

166 Manuscript comment Blair on Minute Powell to Prime Minister, 17 November 2006, ‘Iraq’.

167 Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 27 November 2006, ‘Iraq Strategy Group,

24 November’; Minute McDonald to Banner, 24 November 2006, ‘Iraq Forward Plan’ attaching Draft Paper,

[undated], ‘Iraq: Forward Plan’.

168 The Hydrocarbons Law is addressed in Section 10.3.

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