12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
Iraq.
Additional resources (civilian official and extra CivPol) to aid
Ministerial
capacity‑building,
particularly in the Ministry of Interior, would be a key
place
to add value.”
A Report by
the Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq published
on
6 September
2007 stated that the Iraqi Air Force had a “meagre beginning and
late
start”
compared with the Iraqi Army.979
Development
of the Iraqi Air Force was led by the
Coalition
Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) which was part of
MNSTC‑I.
In June
2004, Maj Gen Houghton recorded that 148 air force
personnel were in training.980
Initially,
the force would be 500 strong. An agreement had been established
for the
transfer of
air transport and helicopters from Jordan.
In July
2005, Lt Gen Brims reported that it was “a long term project”
and that there were
“insufficient
funds to even forecast when a plan might be
considered”.981
On 7 June
2006, the MOD produced an update on ISF progress.982
On the
Iraqi Air Force,
progress
had been made in the adoption of new structures and procedures.
However,
operational
tasks were limited to reconnaissance and air transport, and
equipment
procurement
had proved a challenge.
Initial
recruits to the Iraqi Air Force were people who had served in the
Air Force prior to
The main
objectives of the Iraqi Air Force were:
•
to organise,
train and equip air operations;
•
to conduct
day/night/all‑weather counter‑insurgency operations;
and
•
to provide
homeland capabilities to the Government of Iraq.
The Iraqi
Air Force operated out of four bases:
•
Al Muthanna
Air Base which operated the Air Force’s fixed wing
capability;
•
Taji Air Base
which housed an interim Air Force Academy as well as most of
the
rotary wing
assets; and
•
Basra and
Kirkuk Air Bases which focused on intelligence, surveillance
and
reconnaissance
capabilities.
The Iraqi
Air Force transferred to Iraqi control in September 2006, under the
command
and control
of the Joint Headquarters.984
979
Report, 6
September 2007, ‘Independent Commission on the Security Forces in
Iraq’.
980
Minute
ACDS(Ops) to Rycroft, June 2004, ‘How Best to Progress the
Iraqiisation of the
Security Sector’.
981
Letter
Naworynsky to Quarrey, 21 July 2005, ‘Update on Progress of Iraqi
Security Forces’.
982
Minute
DJC/Iraq to Cabinet Office [junior official], 7 June 2006, ‘Iraq:
Strategy Group Workstrands’
attaching
Paper, ‘Update on Progress of the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF)’.
983
Report, 6
September 2007, ‘Independent Commission on the Security Forces in
Iraq’.
984
JIC
Assessment, 17 January 2007, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Prospects in
2007’.
299