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6.5  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003
guarantee the continuity of the central services; otherwise you would lose the Iraqi
population very rapidly, and that was discussed.”108
221.  In early February, Mr Ricketts advised Mr Straw that the 22 January
Washington talks had made little progress on the principle of UN involvement in
post-conflict administration, and that the US envisaged the UK being responsible
for administering one-fifth of Iraq. The UK risked being drawn into a “huge” and
“complex” commitment in Iraq for an uncertain period.
222.  Mr Ricketts recommended using a series of forthcoming Ministerial contacts
at Cabinet level, which he described as a moment of “maximum leverage” on the
US, to press the case for UN involvement.
223.  In his minute to Mr Straw on 7 February, copied to Mr O’Brien, Sir Michael Jay
(FCO PUS), and other FCO senior officials, Mr Ricketts stated:
“As we approach the critical phase on Iraq, I thought it would be useful to look ahead
to the decisions that will be needed on issues where the FCO is leading and set out
the work coming forward to the Foreign Secretary.”109
224.  Mr Ricketts reported on the follow-up to the 22 January post-conflict talks in
Washington. He stated that Mr Pattison had led a team “to have another go at getting
into the US bloodstream the advantages of UN authorisation and involvement of the UN
and its agencies in the civil administration of Iraq. He made a bit of headway. But this is
water on a stone.” Meanwhile, the Pentagon was accelerating planning for a Pentagon-
run “aftermath organisation” under a US civil administrator alongside the continuing US
military presence. With the US envisaging the UK being responsible for administering
one-fifth of Iraq, “we risk being drawn into a huge commitment of UK resources for a
highly complex task of administration and law and order for an uncertain period”.
225.  Mr Ricketts continued:
“So we have a pressing interest in convincing the Americans to accept the benefits
of a model giving the UN the lead on civil administration. Coalition military forces
would then be responsible for carrying out security tasks, including dealing with
WMD, while a civilian transitional administration would be set up headed by a UN
executive administrator and drawing on the resources of the UN, IFIs and a broad
range of countries, as well as involving Iraqis themselves in the administration as
quickly as possible. This would not only be more realistic and sustainable, but also
be much more acceptable to Arab opinion than US/UK military-led occupation. (It is
also a further argument for getting a second resolution in advance of conflict, which
may be one reason for the allergic reaction in parts of the US system to a UN-led
administration.)
108 Public hearing, 26 November 2009, page 93.
109 Minute Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq Strategy’.
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