6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
guarantee
the continuity of the central services; otherwise you would lose
the Iraqi
population
very rapidly, and that was discussed.”108
221.
In early
February, Mr Ricketts advised Mr Straw that the 22
January
Washington
talks had made little progress on the principle of UN involvement
in
post-conflict
administration, and that the US envisaged the UK being
responsible
for
administering one-fifth of Iraq. The UK risked being drawn into a
“huge” and
“complex”
commitment in Iraq for an uncertain period.
222.
Mr Ricketts
recommended using a series of forthcoming Ministerial
contacts
at Cabinet
level, which he described as a moment of “maximum leverage” on
the
US, to
press the case for UN involvement.
223.
In his minute
to Mr Straw on 7 February, copied to Mr O’Brien, Sir
Michael Jay
(FCO PUS),
and other FCO senior officials, Mr Ricketts
stated:
“As we
approach the critical phase on Iraq, I thought it would be useful
to look ahead
to the
decisions that will be needed on issues where the FCO is leading
and set out
the work
coming forward to the Foreign Secretary.”109
224.
Mr Ricketts
reported on the follow-up to the 22 January post-conflict talks
in
Washington.
He stated that Mr Pattison had led a team “to have another go
at getting
into the US
bloodstream the advantages of UN authorisation and involvement of
the UN
and its
agencies in the civil administration of Iraq. He made a bit of
headway. But this is
water on a
stone.” Meanwhile, the Pentagon was accelerating planning for a
Pentagon-
run
“aftermath organisation” under a US civil administrator alongside
the continuing US
military
presence. With the US envisaging the UK being responsible for
administering
one-fifth
of Iraq, “we risk being drawn into a huge commitment of UK
resources for a
highly
complex task of administration and law and order for an uncertain
period”.
225.
Mr Ricketts
continued:
“So we have
a pressing interest in convincing the Americans to accept the
benefits
of a model
giving the UN the lead on civil administration. Coalition military
forces
would then
be responsible for carrying out security tasks, including dealing
with
WMD, while
a civilian transitional administration would be set up headed by a
UN
executive
administrator and drawing on the resources of the UN, IFIs and a
broad
range of
countries, as well as involving Iraqis themselves in the
administration as
quickly as
possible. This would not only be more realistic and sustainable,
but also
be much
more acceptable to Arab opinion than US/UK military-led occupation.
(It is
also a
further argument for getting a second resolution in advance of
conflict, which
may be one
reason for the allergic reaction in parts of the US system to a
UN-led
administration.)
108
Public
hearing, 26 November 2009, page 93.
109
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq
Strategy’.
349