The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
463.
Mr Scarlett
recommended urgent representations by Ministers and senior
officials
in
Washington, and on diplomatic and intelligence channels in
Canberra. He provided
seven
points to be made with US interlocutors:
“•
Essential
to have handling strategy agreed in Washington, London
and
Canberra.
•
Potentially
high-profile political issue in London.
•
Expect that
Report will feed scepticism about Iraq’s possession of
WMD.
•
Main aim,
therefore, to keep Report profile low and emphasise interim
expert
nature.
•
Do not
favour publishing full Report even in redacted form. It will show
the limits
of our
knowledge and deter other[s] from coming forward. Better to offer
short
Executive
Summary.
•
Need to be
ready to say this is our approach if press are alerted to arrival
of draft
in
Washington.
•
Like to
send team to Washington to concert detailed handling once draft
Report
received.”
464.
Mr Ehrman
discussed the ISG with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD),
the State
Department, the National Security Council (NSC) and the CIA in
Washington
on
12 September.255
He asked
whether the Interim Report needed to be published at
all
and raised
the difficulties UK members of the ISG were having in accessing
sensitive
US
information. US views on publication were mixed, but Dr Kay would
almost certainly
have to
brief Congress. The NSC thought it inevitable that parts of the
Report would
leak and
suggested that it would be better to publish the whole document to
keep leaks
in
context.
465.
The British
Embassy reported that all Mr Ehrman’s interlocutors agreed to
look into
the
“ridiculous situation” of UK access to sensitive US
information.
466.
The ISC
report Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments
was
published on 11 September 2003.
467.
The ISC sent
its report Iraqi Weapons
of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments
to
Mr Blair on 9 September.256
255
Telegram
1191 Washington to FCO London, 14 September 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD:
Ehrman (DG Def/Int)’s
Visit to
Washington, 12 September’.
256
Letter
Taylor to Blair, 9 September 2003, [untitled].
518