3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
360.
Mr Blair
concluded that “one argument worth stressing” was that we “had paid
a
terrible
price” by failing to act on warnings about Al Qaida and the
Taliban:
“We should
not make the same mistakes again ignoring warnings about
the
international
trade in WMD and the threat that this posed to us. We must
educate
the
public.”
361.
After the
meeting, Mr Blair asked for further advice about the nature and
role of the
opposition
to Saddam Hussein inside and outside Iraq; and for advice on the
timetable
for trying
to get weapons inspectors back into Iraq and their
remit.
362.
In the press
conference after the meeting, Vice President Cheney stated
that
London was
“the first stop on an important trip to the Middle East” and
President Bush
had wanted
him to “check in first” with Mr Blair.132
Vice
President Cheney referred to the
“clarity
and conviction” of Mr Blair’s assurance to President Bush on 2
October 2001 that
the UK
would stay with the US “until the last”, and said that he was
“[soliciting] the views
of
important friends and allies” about the “threat of weapons of mass
destruction and the
important
choices that await us in the days ahead”.
363.
Asked about
the second phase of the war on terrorism and what
evidence
there was
that Saddam Hussein had, or shortly would have, the capability to
threaten
countries
in Western Europe or the United States, Mr Blair
replied:
“Let us be
under no doubt whatever. Saddam Hussein has acquired weapons
of
mass
destruction over a long period of time. He is the only leader in
the world that
has
actually used chemical weapons against his own people. He is in
breach of at
least nine
UN Security Council resolutions … He has not allowed the [UN]
weapons
inspectors
to do the job the UN wanted them to do in order to make sure that
he
can’t
develop them … no decisions have been taken on how we deal with
this threat,
but that
there is a threat … is not in doubt at all.”
364.
Addressing the
conflict between Israel and Palestine, Mr Blair said that the
UK
would “do
everything we possibly can to assist the US in the efforts to bring
about some
relaunching”
of the Middle East Peace Process.
365.
Vice President
Cheney stated that effective policies were needed to deal both
with
that
conflict and Iraq: “We have an obligation to deal with both
simultaneously.”
366.
Asked whether,
if Saddam Hussein allowed inspectors back into Iraq, that
would
negate the
need for military action, Vice President Cheney
replied:
“… we feel
very strongly … that it needs to be the kind of inspection regime
that has
no
limitations on it … so … the outside world can have confidence that
he is not
hiding
material that he has promised to give up.”
132
The
National Archives, 11 March 2002, Press
Conference – PM and Vice President Dick Cheney.
451