The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
633.
ACM Stirrup
told the Inquiry:
“… we
simply did not have enough time … to do everything that we needed
to
before the
operation started.”347
634.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit stated that:
“The
timescale was slightly compressed, more than we would have wished,
which
we made
very clear, so that we didn’t have everything that we would have
wanted at
the right
moment, but the shortfall was not operationally significant
…”348
635.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit subsequently told the Inquiry that the switch to the
South:
“ … was not
as difficult as I thought it was going to be … I think it was a
great
achievement
… which surprised me … [T]he quality of the military effort
was
tremendous
… because it wasn’t just a question of moving to a different host
nation
support
arrangements, it’s a question of a differently configured force
…
“I think
the military had been running a slightly parallel option for a bit
of time during
636.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit added:
“I think
that to the extent that there were pressures and problems with the
operation
itself …
those were more about the amount of time available to do the
planning of
the actual
build-up itself, warning time, the switch from one area to another,
the
difficulty
of doing overt military preparations as early as they needed to be
done
because of
the desire not to disrupt the UN track.
“Those were
the bigger problems in ensuring that we got the force structure
ready
when
eventually the time came, and the fact that we would have preferred
another
month, in
ideal circumstances, to do that build-up.”350
637.
Gen Jackson
told the Inquiry that the “whole order of battle” had been “in a
state of
flux” until
early 2003.351
But he
confirmed that he had been confident the UK could put
a
division
into the field.
638.
Gen Jackson
subsequently described the forces deployed as “a very
interesting
divisional
construct” which he did not think had been done before: “but it was
the right
construct
for the task which confronted 1 (UK) Armoured
Division.”352
347
Public
hearing, 1 February 2010, page 11.
348
Public
hearing, 3 February 2010, page 28.
349
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, page 19.
350
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, pages 38-39.
351
Public
hearing, 28 July 2010, page 9.
352
Public
hearing, 28 July 2010, page 13.
104