4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
590.
The draft
speaking note for Sir Richard Dearlove explained that new
information,
obtained
recently when SIS met the sub-source for the first time, cast doubt
on the
reliability
of his intelligence, and that he had provided the report referred
to in the
9 September
2002 JIC Assessment, that:
“Intelligence
also indicates that chemical and biological munitions could be
with
military
units and ready for firing within 20-45 minutes.”
591.
There were
also doubts about other reporting from the sub-source. SIS
was
pursuing
its validation of the reports, but intended to inform Lord Butler
of the issue
before Sir
Richard Dearlove gave further evidence to the Butler Review on 10
June.
592.
When
Mr Straw saw the papers he asked for them to be sent to
Mr Blair “without
delay”,
commenting that SIS’s description of the new information as a
“snag” was “a very
major
understatement”, and that the information seemed “to drive a coach
and horses
through the
veracity of the 45-minute claim”.228
593.
Sir Michael
Jay, commented on the papers:
“I am sure
we must be open with Butler about this – and/wd have thought go
into
more
details than proposed in [draft speaking note] …”229
594.
An SIS
internal minute records that Sir Nigel Sheinwald, who succeeded Sir
David
Manning as
Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of OD Sec in August
2003,
discussed
developments with Mr Blair on 5 June.230
595.
On 7 June, Sir
Nigel wrote to Mr Straw’s Private Office reporting that
Mr Blair
regarded
the information “as a very serious development”, and that he had
“asked for a
clear
damage assessment”.231
596.
Mr Blair
had also asked:
•
how the
overall intelligence picture would be affected;
•
what was
“the position regarding the other main sources on Iraqi WMD”;
and
•
“where do
we stand in our assessment of the veracity of Curve Ball’s
material
[the source
for the majority of the reporting on mobile production facilities
for
biological
agents]”.
597.
Mr Blair
agreed that Sir Richard Dearlove should brief Lord Butler, and that
that
should take
place before other witnesses gave evidence to Lord Butler (on 8
June).
228
Minute
Adams to Kidd, 4 June 2004, ‘Butler Review: Sourcing of 45 Minute
Report’.
229
Manuscript
comment Jay on Minute Adams to Kidd, 4 June 2004, ‘Butler Review:
Sourcing of
45 Minute Report’.
230
Minute SIS,
7 June 2004, ‘Butler Review/SIS: Sourcing of 45 Minute
Report’.
231
Minute
Sheinwald to Adams, 7 June 2004, ‘Butler Review: Sourcing of 45
Minute Report’.
393