The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
450.
Mr Cannon
reported the main points from the meeting to Mr McDonald.
The
meeting had
identified “over-zealous” de-Ba’athification and the CPA’s failure
to provide
funding for
the South as causes of insecurity there. It had agreed
that:
•
Mr Blair
should tell President Bush that the UK needed “the
decision-making
process on
a different footing, so that problems are rapidly referred to
the
highest
level and obstacles short-cut”.
•
Mr Blair
should write to Ambassador Bremer listing specific projects in the
Basra
area
needing immediate CPA funding.
•
Baroness
Amos would visit “the UK sector” to enhance DFID
operations.
•
Ms Hewitt
should try to visit Iraq to promote the involvement of UK
business.
451.
Mr Blair
spoke to President Bush later that day.248
In his report
to Mr McDonald
of the
conversation, Mr Cannon wrote that Mr Blair had said his
main concern was
administration;
Ambassador Bremer needed to be able to break through the
bureaucratic
obstacles
that he faced.
452.
Mr Blair
raised the difficulty Ambassador Bremer was having accessing the
funding
he needed.
UK projects in Basra had been affected. Mr Blair said that he
would write to
both
Ambassador Bremer and President Bush setting out those
projects.
453.
Mr Blair
raised delays in Bechtel’s operations, including unnecessary delays
in
agreeing a
contract for Siemens UK. The US was chasing Bechtel.
454.
Mr Blair
also raised the need for action on replacing Iraq’s
currency.
455.
The Inquiry
has seen no indications that Mr Blair wrote to Ambassador
Bremer and
President
Bush, listing the projects requiring immediate CPA
funding.
456.
The Annotated
Agenda for the 11 June meeting of the AHMGIR stated that
the
list of
projects “which urgently need to be taken forward in and around
Basra”, which
Mr Straw
had sent to Mr Blair on 5 June, would “for the most part be
implemented as
quick
impact projects, once additional engineering staff are in place
(DFID is undertaking
457.
The Cabinet
Office produced a draft proposal for a new, DFID-led
Iraq
Rehabilitation
Operations Group (IROG) on 10 June.250
The Cabinet
Office proposal
stated
that, while current administrative structures were “satisfactory
and worth keeping”,
now that
the UK was moving into an “increasingly operational phase” they
were no
longer
sufficient. DFID should lead a new Group with a remit to
oversee:
•
priorities
for expenditure from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), including
the
process of
reaching decisions on such expenditures;
248
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 6 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 6th June’.
249 Annotated
Agenda, 12 June 2003 Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
250
Minute
Bowen to DFID, 10 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Management
Arrangements’.
82