4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
September
2003.319
The ISC
stated that it had “looked at the supporting intelligence
in
critical
areas to ensure that the [JIC] Assessments reflected the
intelligence correctly”.
592.
The
Report of the
Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death
of
Dr David
L Kelly CMG by Lord Hutton
(“The Hutton Inquiry”, HC 247), was published on
593.
In relation to
the question of whether the judgements were improperly
influenced
by
Mr Campbell or No.10, Lord Hutton concluded:
“Mr Campbell
made it clear to Mr Scarlett on behalf of the Prime Minister
that
10 Downing
Street wanted the dossier to be worded to make as strong a
case
as possible
in relation to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s WMD,
and
10 Downing
Street made written suggestions to Mr Scarlett as to
changes in
the wording
of the draft dossier which would strengthen it. But
Mr Campbell
recognised, and
told Mr Scarlett that 10 Downing Street recognised, that
nothing
should be
stated in the dossier with which the intelligence community were
not
entirely
happy.
“Mr Scarlett
accepted some of the drafting amendments suggested to him
by
10 Downing
Street but he only accepted those suggestions which were
consistent
with the
intelligence known to the JIC and he rejected those suggestions
which were
not
consistent with such intelligence and the dossier … was approved by
the JIC.
“As the
dossier was one to be presented to, and read by, Parliament and
the
public … I
do not consider that it was improper for Mr Scarlett and the
JIC to take
into
account suggestions as to drafting made by 10 Downing Street and to
adopt
those
suggestions if they were consistent with the intelligence available
to the JIC.
However I
consider that the possibility cannot be completely ruled out that
the desire
of the
Prime Minister to have a dossier which, whilst consistent with the
available
intelligence,
was as strong as possible in relation to the threat posed by
Saddam
Hussein’s
WMD, may have subconsciously influenced Mr Scarlett and
other
members of
the JIC to make the wording of the dossier somewhat stronger
than
it would
have been if it had been contained in a normal JIC Assessment.
Although
this
possibility cannot be completely ruled out, I am satisfied that
Mr Scarlett, the
other
members of the JIC, and the members of the Assessment Staff engaged
in
the
drafting of the dossier were concerned to ensure that the contents
of the dossier
were
consistent with the intelligence available to the JIC.
“The term
‘sexed-up’ is a slang expression, the meaning of which lacks
clarity in
the context
of the discussion of the dossier. It is capable of two different
meanings.
319
Intelligence
and Security Committee, Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments,
September 2003, Cm5972.
320
Report of the
Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David L
Kelly CMG
by Lord Hutton
[“The Hutton
Inquiry”], 28 January 2004, HC 247, pages 2-3.
227