The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“We do not
expect a massive surge in extremist sentiment”. The Shia
were
unlikely to
repeat the 1991 mistake of calling for a Khomeinist regime, a
move
which had
alienated many Iraqis who might have joined them.
•
A number of
extremist groups were likely to use violence to pursue their
political
ends.
968.
The FCO
proposed a number of “practical steps” to provide
stability.
969.
In the short
term, support for more extreme groups could be limited
by:
•
avoiding
Shia shrines and important religious buildings during military
action;
•
improving
economic conditions as quickly as possible;
•
winning
hearts and minds through public information and media
campaigns;
•
discouraging
meddling by Iran and other regional players;
•
maintaining
Israel’s neutrality during military action and making progress
on
Israel/Palestine;
and
•
“Maintaining
firm control on the internal security situation and moving quickly
to
suppress
any international terrorist groups in the country.”
970.
The FCO
suggested that, in order to ensure longer-term stability and
development,
there would
be an overriding interest in the rapid emergence of “a political
class with
whom we can
do business”. Focusing on pro-Western groups would be
short-sighted.
It could
create:
“… a
further breeding ground for resentment, extremism and ultimately
terrorism
directed
both against any new regime and Western targets. It would be seen
as
another
example of Western hostility to Islam and double standards. It
would be a
recipe for
longer-term instability.”
Instead,
Islamist groups and religious leaders should be involved in the
creation of the
new Iraqi
political system.
“•
We should
plan on the basis that political Islam will be a significant force
in many
of the
post-Saddam scenarios …
•
We should
work to limit the support the extremist elements receive
…
•
We should
look to engage those moderate groups which are willing to
work
with us,
even if they disagree strongly with some of our values. This
means
being
prepared to accept the emergence of a religiously conservative
and
anti‑Western
regime if that is what Iraqis want.
•
The
approach the Americans adopt will be crucial. We should engage them
on
this
issue.”
276