5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
material
breach of its obligations under successive mandatory UN
Security
Council
resolutions; and
•
note the
opinion of the Attorney General that, Iraq having failed to comply
and
Iraq being
at the time of resolution 1441 and continuing to be in material
breach,
the
authority to use force under resolution 678 has revived and so
continued
774.
In his speech
Mr Blair did not address the events that had taken place since
the
declaration
“as the House is familiar with them”. He stated that “all members”
of the
Security
Council “accepted” the Iraq declaration was false. He
added:
“That in
itself, incidentally, is a material breach. Iraq has taken some
steps in
co‑operation
but, no one disputes that it is not fully
co-operating.”331
775.
Mr Blair
did not address how, in the absence of a consideration in the
Security
Council,
the UK Government had reached the judgement that Iraq had failed to
take
its final
opportunity.
776.
The debate in
the House of Commons and the details of Mr Blair’s speech
are
described
in Section 3.8.
777.
In his
discussion with President Bush on 15 March, Mr Blair proposed
that
the main
message from the Azores Summit should be that this was the
final
chance for
Saddam Hussein to demonstrate that he had taken the
strategic
decision to
avert war; and that members of the Security Council should be
able
to sanction
the use of force as Iraq was in material breach of its
obligations.
778.
When
Mr Blair spoke to President Bush on 15 March, he said that the
“main
message”
for the Azores Summit “should be that this was a final chance for
the UN to
deliver,
and that countries should be able to sanction the use of force as
Iraq was in
779.
Mr Blair
spoke to Mrs Margaret Beckett, Secretary of State for the
Environment,
Food and
Rural Affairs, before her appearance on the BBC’s
The World
at One on
780.
Asked why he
was not putting the second resolution to the vote, Mr Blair
explained
that losing
a vote “… might cause legal difficulties”. Mr Annan was “very
keen to avoid
330
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 18 March
2003, column 760.
331
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 18 March
2003, column 762.
332
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 15 March 2003, ‘Iraq and Middle East: Prime
Minister’s Telephone
Conversation
with President Bush, 15 March’.
333
Minute
No.10 [junior official] to Matthews, 17 March 2003, ‘Note for
File’.
139