The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
119.
Sir Richard
told one US official that, in addition to setting out clearly
and
persuasively
that Iraq had failed to abide by resolution 1441:
“… we
needed to continue on parallel tracks designed to reinforce the
case, and for
HMG, to
give the PM sufficient evidence of a breach which the declaration
by itself
did not. We
needed:
•
a detailed
audit of the declaration
•
to press
the interview issue or force Saddam’s refusal to
co-operate
•
to prepare
for the release of intelligence to prove deception
•
to press on
with a rigorous inspection regime absent a
‘silver-bullet’.”
120.
Sir Richard
said that “perhaps by the end of January all those elements would
have
produced
sufficient evidence to make the convincing case we needed”. A
“convincing
defector or
a revealing site inspection” would be preferable, “but we could not
depend on
this”. He
added later that “success was far from guaranteed”.
121.
In a separate
conversation with another official, Sir Richard Dearlove had said
that
he
“estimated the chance of a successful operation to produce a
defector or a smoking
gun at
about 20 percent”.
122.
In a
manuscript comment to Mr Blair, Sir David wrote that “we
should go flat out” to
find a
defector or evidence in a site inspection.41
123.
Mr Blair
replied: “absolutely”.42
124.
Against Sir
Richard’s estimate of the chances of success, Mr Jonathan
Powell,
Mr Blair’s
Chief of Staff, wrote: “Not good”.43
125.
On the
description of a discussion about a possible presentation of
intelligence
“when
conflict was inevitable”, including overhead photographs of
material being moved
and
intercepts of conversations about deception operations,
Mr Blair wrote “but can’t this
be used to
convince Blix?”44
126.
By December
2002, doubts had emerged within SIS about the reliability
of
the source
who had given SIS the reporting issued on 11 and 23
September.
41
Manuscript
comment Manning, [undated], on Letter PS/C to Manning, 18 December
2002, ‘Iraq:
C’s
discussions in Washington 16-17 December’.
42
Manuscript
comment Blair, [undated], on Letter PS/C to Manning, 18 December
2002, ‘Iraq:
C’s
discussions in Washington 16-17 December’.
43
Manuscript
comment Powell, [undated], on Letter PS/C to Manning, 18 December
2002, ‘Iraq:
C’s
discussions in Washington 16-17 December’.
44
Manuscript
comment Blair, [undated], on Letter PS/C to Manning, 18 December
2002, ‘Iraq:
C’s
discussions in Washington 16-17 December’.
312