The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“… there
could be advantage in the MOD doing some discreet internal
strategic
estimating.
This should help us think through what would be the key
strategic
objectives
and the end states and the ‘centre of gravity’ of the situation we
need to
tackle …
When the time came for discussion with the US, our pre‑thinking and
ability
to offer a
well thought‑through force contribution (up to a division, though
obviously
less if
possible) would give us clout: and also a respectable position from
which to
judge
whether their proposals offer adequate return for
risk.”
182.
On the way
forward, Mr Webb wrote:
“Despite
the massive scale of commitment, there are arguments that
preventing the
spread of
WMD should be given the highest priority in coming years … [I]t
remains
the
greatest risk to Middle East and international stability in the
medium‑term;
and in the
long‑term countries like Iraq and Iran are on course to threaten
Europe
and UK
direct. It is arguable that preventing this spread by making an
example
of
Saddam Hussein would do more for long‑term stability than all
the displaced
[military]
activities combined …
“By
demonstrating our capacity for high intensity warfare at large
scale the UK would
also send a
powerful deterrence message to other potential WMD proliferators
and
adversaries.
“… There
would come a point at which preparations could apply some
valuable
pressure on
Saddam; or be seen as a natural reaction to prevarication
over
inspections.
In general … until that point … we should keep a low profile
…”
“Even these
preparatory steps would properly need a Cabinet Committee
decision,
based on a
minute from the Defence Secretary. The FCO are content for
activity
to be
centred on MOD, to preserve the best prospect for dialogue with US
DOD
[Department
of Defense] …”
184.
At a meeting
on 18 April to discuss Mr Webb’s minute, Mr Hoon found
the analysis
“generally
persuasive”; but asked for further work to examine the feasibility
of making
a smaller
contribution.93
He sought
options “short of participation in a full ground
offensive”.
185.
Mr Hoon
said that more thought needed to be given to the legal aspects
as:
“Prima
facie, the best legal foundation for any operation to displace
Saddam’s
regime was
that it would remove the threat posed by his WMD. However it
was
93
Minute
Watkins to Policy Director, 18 April 2002, ‘Iraq’.
204