3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
262.
At the end of
November, Mr Powell produced a second note for Mr Blair,
‘Iraq:
Change of
Heart or Change of Regime’,
which
elaborated the points in his earlier note.134
263.
Mr Powell
identified the “Objectives” as:
“Removal of
Saddam and replacement by a new, more moderate regime. Ending
of
WMD
programmes and destruction of stocks. Ending of support for
terrorism. Peace
with
neighbours.”
264.
Mr Powell
envisaged a “Plan” comprising diplomatic pressure “followed
by
[a]
military campaign (without large scale coalition ground forces)”;
the insertion of
inspectors
which would not, “by itself, be sufficient to stop the campaign”
which would
end “only …
with the replacement of Saddam”.
265.
Mr Powell set
out three steps:
•
Using the
power of the example of US success in Afghanistan to
increase
pressure on
Saddam”. There were already signs that he was worried and
might
be
“prepared to accept return of inspectors if he thinks [the]
prospect[s] of attack
are
serious”. The US should: “After the fall of Kandahar and the
capture of UBL”,
make clear
that “Iraq is next (in parallel with action in other countries,
e.g. […]).”
•
The “US, UK
and others” to “set up” a UN “demand” for the return of
inspectors.
If that did
not happen, action would be taken. It would be “important not to
be
specific”
about what the action would comprise nor “to set a deadline”,
and
to keep
Saddam Hussein guessing. If asked, the reply would be that
“regime
change
would be desirable, but not our formal objective for the
moment”.
•
Put in
place, a military plan, and if Saddam failed to meet the demands,
“there
would be
grounds to go ahead with the military plan … [reference to a
possible
coup].
Supported by air power and a small numbers of Special Forces in
support
roles. Need
to be clear with everyone that this time we are going all the way
…”
If Saddam
Hussein did allow the inspectors in, there would be a “need to find
a
new demand
to justify military action”.
266.
Mr Powell
identified a number of “Conditions”, including:
•
“[N]one of
this will work unless we can isolate Saddam further in the
international
community”.
•
The need to
secure support from Russia, France, the Middle East and
Europe.
•
Making
progress “in parallel” on the MEPP. That would be: “Absolutely
essential
… or we
will be accused – correctly – of double standards.”
134
Note
Powell, [undated], ‘Iraq: Change of Heart or Change of
Regime’.
357