The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
413.
Sir Nigel went
on to set out in detail Mr Blair’s views in relation to policy
on the
political
process and security. The single paragraph on reconstruction
read:
“It is
unlikely that we will be able to enhance significantly the impact
of reconstruction
activities
in the period before elections. But he [Mr Blair] would be
grateful if
Hilary Benn
could work hard with the World Bank and UN in particular – their
future
engagement
is critical. We also need a more effective link-up between DFID and
the
US agencies
involved.”
414.
Sir Nigel
reported that Mr Blair planned to chair a meeting of DOP(I)
every fortnight
if
possible. Sir Nigel would chair weekly meetings of senior
officials. Mr Straw and
Dr Reid
were also to chair regular Ministerial meetings in their
areas.
415.
Mr Chakrabarti
and Mr Dinham visited Iraq from 4 to 6 October to review
DFID’s
programme
and consider future plans in the light of the forthcoming Iraqi
elections and
UK military
transition planning.239
416.
Their report
to Mr Benn, copies of which were sent to Sir Nigel
Sheinwald,
senior
officials in the Cabinet Office, MOD, FCO and the Treasury, and UK
military
commanders
and officials in Iraq, recommended that DFID should shift its focus
from
the South
and infrastructure projects to building institutional capacity in
Baghdad. That
recommendation
reflected “remarkable unanimity of advice from a range of
interlocutors,
including
our political and military colleagues in both Baghdad and Basra” on
where
DFID’s
comparative advantage lay in a “uniquely difficult
environment”.
417.
Mr Chakrabarti
and Mr Dinham reported that UN staff were back in Iraq
and
playing a
key role in donor co-ordination. The EC was “visible, albeit with a
small and
focused
presence”. A key gap remained the absence of a permanent World Bank
or IMF
representative.
418.
The Iraqi
Government remained unenthusiastic on the Najibiyah power
plant
project
(for which DFID had hoped to secure US$21m in funding from the
World Bank
Trust
Fund); there was no value in pressing this further.
419.
On funding,
the US was now looking for other donors to “pick up the tab”
for
reconstruction;
none had yet stepped forward:
“A[n] …
immediate worry for the first year of an incoming Government is
the
likelihood
of a funding crisis as US money thins out and the multilaterals are
not
yet on
stream.”
420.
If DFID was to
focus on building institutional capacity in Baghdad, it would
need
to consider
whether its current model – using international consultants, with
their
attendant
high security costs – remained “fit for purpose”. The Iraqi
Government was
239
Minute
Chakrabarti and Dinham to Secretary of State [DFID], 7 October
2005, ‘Iraq Visit,
4 – 6 October 2005’.
266