The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
in order
to achieve peace and prosperity. The result will not be pretty, and
will no
doubt have
distasteful people in power … but to be sustainable the solution
must
be an
Iraqi one.”
566.
In his weekly
report of 4 November, Lt Gen Rollo agreed that “concrete
action”
would be
necessary to make good on the commitments to accelerate
economic
development
in Basra.265
The work
would require “dedicated cells in London
and Basra
with clear accountability and an aggressive timeline” in order to
be able
“to clout
not dribble”.
567.
Lt Gen Rollo
commented that Mr Browne’s visit had prompted useful US
debate
about the
UK’s requirement for a Security Council resolution
because:
“The effect
of the lack of UNSCR cover for our operations had not been
fully
appreciated
here, although it had been discussed in Washington.”
568.
When the Iraq
Strategy Group discussed renewal of the resolution on 5
November,
the FCO
position was described by Mr Baker as “to keep options open
for 2009 in case
a further
resolution were required.”266
Mr McDonald
told the Iraq Strategy Group that:
“… the
Prime Minister was content that the next SCR would be the last, and
given
our stated
plan for next year, it would send the wrong message if we appeared
to
be pushing
far more than the US to keep our options open. If the US did not
agree
to our
latest suggested amendments therefore, we should accept that as the
last
word. We
should ensure, however, that all parts of the US system were aware
of the
consequences
for the UK commitment of not having a SCR mandate.”
569.
Mr McDonald
also told the Iraq Strategy Group that there would be a review
of
the UK’s
civilian and military posture in Iraq in spring 2008, when
Ministers might take
decisions
on future plans for 2009 and beyond. He cautioned that it was too
early to
make
assumptions about what the future posture might be, and that it
should not be
discussed
with the US or Iraqis, but the long-term objective was “strategic
overwatch
in Iraq”.
Papers were commissioned from the FCO and MOD for discussion by the
Iraq
Strategy
Group, and eventually for Ministers’ Christmas red
boxes.
570.
On 5 November,
in an account of a further meeting with JAM1, a
government
official
working closely with the military recorded that a formal request
for releases from
US
detention was with Lt Gen Odierno for
consideration.267
571.
In the meeting
itself, JAM1 had not, as expected, pushed for himself to be one
of
those
released on 10 November but officials had been prompted to consider
whether it
265
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 4 November 2007, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (275) 4 Nov
07’.
266
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 6 November 2007,
‘Iraq Strategy Group,
5 November’.
267
Email
government official working closely with the military, 5 November
2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
[JAM1] Meeting 4 November’.
288