The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
508.
The NSC was
reported by the British Embassy Washington to be leaning
towards
the idea of
a provisional government.284
No firm
conclusion had been reached, but there
was “broad
agreement on the need to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis during
2004”.
509.
Sir Hilary
Synnott told the Inquiry that:
“As time
progressed, it became clear that … there was a genuine
insurgency
developing.
The influence of Muqtada al-Sadr was very great and, of course, it
was
primarily
north of our region, but it became clear to me in about November
that an
infection
was starting to spread south.”285
510.
Gen Abizaid
called on Sir Nigel Sheinwald on 4 November.286
Gen Abizaid
said that
resistance
was coalescing in the Sunni areas around former regime elements,
backed
to some
extent by foreign fighters and international terrorists. Gen
Abizaid saw the
insurgency
as “still at a low level” and lacking majority support even among
the Sunnis.
511.
Gen Abizaid’s
solution was to accelerate Iraqiisation of the security
forces
whilst also
improving their quality, a political ‘road map’ and a
reconciliation process for
Sunni
communities.
512.
Mr Straw
told Cabinet on 6 November that “adjustments to the current plan
were
needed” in
relation to the political process.287
He would
pursue discussions in the US the
following
week, but it would be an “iterative process” involving the
GC.
513.
When
Mr Blair spoke to President Bush by video conference on 6
November, he
commented
that the question was “how quickly could we move to
elections”.288
Mr Blair
thought the quicker the better, “but both the Iraqis and we needed
to be able
to handle it”.
514.
Mr Blair
commented that “with progress on infrastructure etc, we were now
down
to a
specific problem of how to deal with a small group of terrorists”.
They wanted to
provoke a
reaction, so that the security presence became heavier and the
population
turned
against the Coalition. Mr Blair suggested that some Sunnis
were “desperate to
be on our
side” and that infrastructure projects that would benefit the Sunni
community
should be
completed. He commented that:
“A stable,
prosperous Iraq would send a powerful signal to the region. That
was why
the
extremists were desperate to stop us, and why we had to
succeed.”
284
Letter
[junior official] to Sawers, 31 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
285
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 62.
286
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 4 November 2003, ‘Iraq: General Abizaid’s call on
Sir Nigel Sheinwald’.
287
Cabinet
Conclusions, 6 November 2003.
288
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 6 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with President Bush,
6 November’.
290