1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
“Not really
because there wasn’t any great confidence that UNMOVIC would be
any
more
successful than UNSCOM had been … and we didn’t think that we could
force
Saddam
through military action to accept an inspections
regime.”122
213.
The record of
the Camp David meeting, produced by Mr Sawers, stated that
the
US and UK
agreed on the need for a policy on Iraq which was more widely
supported in
the Middle
East region.123
214.
As a result of
the policy of the previous 10 years, Iraq was not as large a threat
as
it could
have been (including to Kuwait); but Saddam Hussein was still
pursuing WMD
(he had
done little on the nuclear side).
215.
In Mr Blair’s
view, the approach should be to:
•
refocus
sanctions on those items which Saddam Hussein really
needed;
•
control his
money supply but allow him to use it for non-military
economic
advancement;
and
•
retain the
capacity for military action.
216.
Mr Blair
stated that we should not say that we were relaxing our policy
because
sanctions
had not worked.
217.
Mr Blair
concluded that we must improve our public presentation. He
suggested
that the
approach should be presented as a “deal” comprising four
elements:
•
do the
right thing by the Iraqi people, with whom we have no
quarrel;
•
tighten
weapons controls on Saddam Hussein;
•
retain
financial control on Saddam Hussein; and
•
retain our
ability to strike.
218.
The record
also reported a subsequent conversation between Mr Sawers
and
Dr Rice. Dr
Rice had agreed with Mr Sawers’ assessment that “we were still a
long
way from
having a new policy on Iraq”. Mr Sawers commended the work of
INDICT
and stated
that the UK favoured charging Saddam Hussein and a few others with
war
crimes; but
the indictments should not go too wide as others needed an
incentive to
move
against Saddam Hussein. Mr Sawers also set out Mr Cook’s idea of a
‘Contract
with the
Iraqi People’, in which there was some interest.
219.
On the
follow-up to the talks, Mr Sawers suggested:
“… we need
to start doing more detailed work on the sanctions aspects …
perhaps
we should
now produce our own detailed paper on what steps to take … We
are
122
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, pages 16-17.
123
Letter
Sawers to Cowper-Coles, 24 February 2001, ‘Prime Minister’s Talks
with President Bush,
Camp David,
23 February 2001’.
233