The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

608.  The junior FCO official also described an alternative option, which was “to

continue to limit the basis of our accommodation with JAM to detainee release”.

If this option was to be selected, it was unlikely that “calm” in Basra would be

sustained beyond the release of the last detainee.

609.  In contrast to advice provided to Mr Browne a few days earlier, the junior FCO

official proposed that discussions with JAM1 should be kept as low key as possible

because “media attention would likely portray these as a tacit acknowledgement of

defeat for the UK in southern Iraq”.

610.  The junior FCO official wrote that negotiations with JAM1 had always included

a political element, but that the “continuation and formalisation” of these talks was

intended to bind JAM1 and the Sadrists into political reconciliation before JAM1’s

release. The specific objectives of talks would be to secure commitments from JAM1 on:

• free and fair elections in Basra;

• support for the Iraqi authorities to limit crime and violence in Basra;

• ending hostilities;

• ending attacks on MNF current or former employees; and

• disarmament.

611.  The junior FCO official recorded that Maj Gen Binns was recommending to

Mr Browne that JAM1 was released earlier than planned if “significant progress”

was made against these objectives.

612.  The greatest risk was a described as “a failure of an accommodation with

[JAM1]”, which was likely to mean a return to a high level of attacks against the MNF.

The main threats to the dialogue were:

• JAM1 concluding that he could better advance his political interests

through violence;

• JAM1 being killed after release;

• JAM1 losing control of JAM in Basra; and

• JAM being drawn into large-scale fighting with the MNF.

613.  The junior FCO official also described the risk of negative reactions from the US

and from the Iraqi Government, and of losing traction with other parties in Basra by

expanding the scope of engagement with JAM.

614.  Baroness Scotland visited Iraq between 19 and 21 November.285 In a report of

her visit sent to Mr Miliband, Baroness Scotland observed that, while a lot had been

achieved, “there is a long way to go to establish the rule of law in Iraq”. She had

discussed the implications of a lack of a further resolution for the UK’s continued

285  Letter Scotland to Miliband, 3 December 2007, ‘Iraq’.

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