The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
98.
The JIC and
DIS judgements on plague were “based on several intelligence
reports
from a
single informant described as ‘a new
source of unestablished reliability’” and
who
was “felt
to be in a position to comment authoritatively”.
99.
The Butler
Report observed that, in relation to Iraq’s chemical warfare
capability,
the report:
“… added
new detail to the JIC’s existing body of knowledge covering the
types of
chemical
agents held in the Iraqi stockpile; the capabilities of those
agents; their
weaponisation
into free-fall bombs; the availability of suitable ballistic
missiles for the
delivery of
particular agents; and the volumes of each type of agent, and hence
of
the total
chemical agent stockpile.”28
100.
On the basis
of that report, the JIC “briefly” put “Iraq’s total chemical agent
stocks in
the range
15,000-22,000 tonnes”.
101.
A JIC
Assessment before military action against Iraq in 1991, intended
“to provide
military
commanders with an indication of the possible scale of Iraq’s use
of chemical
weapons,
and of how long such use could be sustained”, subsequently reduced
the
estimate of
the size of the stockpile, to between 6,000-10,000 tonnes of
agent.29
102.
The enduring
effect of that Assessment is addressed later in this
Section.
103.
Iraq fired 86
of its SCUD missiles during the 1991 conflict, 40 against
Israel,
44 against
Saudi Arabia and two in the direction of Bahrain and
Qatar.30
No Al
Abbas
104.
Based on its
Assessment in September 1990, the JIC concluded on 17 April
1991
that Iraq
might have up to 600 ballistic missiles left, “both standard SCUD
and extended
range
variants”, but the figure was “probably less”.32
105.
The Butler
Report commented that JIC Assessments of Iraq’s chemical
warfare
and
ballistic missile programmes before military action in 1991 were
“done on what was
effectively
a worst case basis”, but that was not made explicitly
clear.33
106.
Reporting in
2005, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) concluded that in 1991
the
coalition’s
military actions had:
28
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
45.
29
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
46.
30
Ministry of
Defence, Statement
on the Defence Estimates, July
1991, page 22.
31
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
49.
32
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
50.
33
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
page
49.
42