3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
79.
Mr Matthew
Rycroft, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
commented to
Sir David
Manning that the document was:
“… helpful.
Of course a S[ecurity] C[ouncil] discussion is needed if there is a
material
breach. But
as the PM has said all along that discussion must be in the context
of an
understanding
that action must follow.”24
80.
Mr Straw
held an office meeting on 20 November to discuss Iraq policy
with
Sir Michael
Jay, FCO Permanent Under Secretary (PUS), Sir Jeremy
Greenstock,
Sir David
Manning, and Mr Peter Ricketts, FCO Political
Director.25
81.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told Mr Straw that he “believed we could get a
second
resolution
provided the Americans did not go for material breach too early”.
The “facts
to convince
nine members of the Security Council” would be needed. He thought
that
the Council
“would not … need much persuading”.
82.
Sir Jeremy
proposed that “When the time came”, the UK should put down a
draft
resolution
and, “if we could show that we had done everything possible, then
we would
be in the
best possible position if – in the end – there were no
resolution”.
83.
Sir David
Manning suggested that France should be invited to co‑sponsor
the
resolution.
Mr Straw agreed.
84.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock advised that “the real strength” of resolution 1441 lay
in its
first two
operative paragraphs: OP1 reaffirming Iraq’s material breach up to
the adoption
of 1441 and
OP2 suspending that material breach to give Iraq a final
opportunity.
Sir Jeremy
stated that OP4 (and 11 and 12) were, therefore, not needed to
reach the
“serious
consequences” in OP13. He was already using that argument in the
Security
Council and
cautioned Mr Straw that focusing too much on OP4 brought a
danger of
weakening
OPs 1 and 2.
85.
Sir Michael
Jay took a different view, advising that the UK could use all the
OPs
in resolution
1441. Mr Straw agreed that it would be a mistake to focus
exclusively on
OPs 1 and
2.
86.
In his
remarks at the NATO Summit in Prague on 21 November and in
his
subsequent
statement to Parliament on 25 November, Mr Blair emphasised
the
resolve of
the international community and his hope that that would result in
the
peaceful
disarmament of Iraq; but that if it did not there was a commitment
to act.
24
Manuscript
comment Rycroft, 20 November 2002 on Paper [unattributed and
undated], ‘Background on
Material
Breach’.
25
Minute
McDonald to Gray, 20 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Follow‑up to SCR
1441’.
19