The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
891.
Mr Blair
added that there were various uncertainties:
•
Saddam
Hussein might claim at the eleventh hour to have had a
change
of heart.
•
We could
not be sure that Dr Blix’s second and third reports would be
as helpful
as his
first.
892.
Mr Blair
was, therefore, flexible about the timing of the second resolution.
If we
could get
it quickly, “well and good”. But the key was to ensure that we
secured it.
We had
taken the UN route in the expectation that the UN would deal with
the Iraq
problem,
not provide an alibi for avoiding the tough decisions. Resolution
1441 was
clear that
this was Saddam Hussein’s final opportunity. We had been very
patient.
Now we
should be saying that the crisis must be resolved in weeks, not
months.
The international
community had to confront the challenges of WMD and terrorism
now.
893.
Mr Blair
told President Bush that the second resolution:
“… was not
code for delay or hesitation. It was a clear statement that
Saddam
was not
co‑operating and that the international community was determined to
do
whatever it
took to disarm him. We needed to put the debate in a wider
context.
The international
community had to confront the challenges of WMD and
terrorism
now,
whether in Iraq or North Korea, otherwise the risks would only
increase.”
894.
President Bush
and Mr Blair discussed Dr ElBaradei’s analysis on the
aluminium
tubes
procured by Iraq. They also discussed the uncertainties and risks
arising from
Saddam
Hussein’s potential actions.
895.
On military
planning, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed the
possibility that
Iraqi
forces would fold quickly. Mr Blair asked about planning for
the aftermath. In his
view a UN
badge would be needed. That would help with the humanitarian
problems.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed an initial military occupation, how to
manage
the dilemma
of managing the transition to civil administration and the nature
of an
Iraqi government.
896.
Mr Blair
concluded that the US and UK needed to prepare to organise on a
“war
footing”
working very closely together “particularly on our public
communications”.
897.
Sir David
Manning recorded that it was clear that the window of opportunity
would
be only a
few weeks. Otherwise the US would take military action. The
military campaign
could begin
“around 10 March”, and earlier if Dr Blix’s report on 14
February was tough.
The timing
was “very tight”.
898.
The UK should
do all it could to help the inspectors make a significant find
and
work hard
on the other members of the Security Council to accept the
“non‑co‑operation
case” to
“secure the minimum nine votes when we need them, probably by the
end
of February”.
164