4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
52.
The Assessment
also stated:
“Iraq also
researched a number of other agents within its offensive
programme,
some of
which may be available for production. “Iraq can weaponise CBW
agents
into
missile warheads, bombs, artillery rockets and shells, and could
adapt
helicopters,
manned and un-manned aircraft … to disseminate agent. CBW plays
an
important
role in Iraqi military thinking. As compensation for its
conventional military
weakness
Iraq is determined to retain CBW in order to dominate its
neighbours.
Intelligence
indicates Iraq is ready to use CBW weapons and that munitions
could
be with
military units and ready for firing within 20-45
minutes.”
53.
Addressing the
judgements in the Assessment, the Review of
Intelligence on
Weapons of
Mass Destruction, chaired by
Lord Butler of Brockwell, stated:
“The
judgement that Iraq was continuing to produce chemical agent was
supported
by one new
intelligence report received on 30 September.”15
“… The most
significant change in this assessment was in the JIC’s
indication
… that the
intelligence on mobile biological agent production facilities had
been
‘confirmed’
… based on the receipt of one intelligence report, from a
reliable
and
established source quoting a new sub-source. That report reinforced
the
large
volume of reports on those facilities received from a single source
through
a liaison
service since April 2000, although our view is that the new report
was
complementary
to rather than confirming those from the liaison
source.”16
54.
Resolution
1441 was adopted on 8 November 2002 by a unanimous vote of
the
members of
the Security Council.17
Referring
to his statement on 17 October, during the
Security
Council’s open debate on Iraq, Sir Jeremy Greenstock stated that
there was
“no shadow
of doubt” that Iraq had defied the UN and had sought to hinder and
frustrate
inspections
since 1991.
55.
Iraq
announced on 13 November that it would comply with resolution
1441.
56.
Iraq
re-stated its position that it had neither produced nor was in
possession
of weapons
of mass destruction since the inspectors left in December 1998.
It
explicitly
challenged the UK statement on 8 November that Iraq had “decided
to
keep
possession” of its WMD.
15
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
347.
16
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
349.
17
UN Security
Council, ‘4644th Meeting Friday 8 November 2002’
(S/PV.4644).
301