12.1 | Security Sector Reform

1171. On the balance of power between the police and the army, the JIC stated:

“The army cannot provide local security or enforce the law while it remains focused

on COINOPS [counter‑insurgency operations], and its method of operation –

checkpoints, barriers, destruction of property – are unsuited to the task. Until the IPS

and the justice system are improved and purged of militia influence and corruption,

Iraq will need to choose between army methods and a police force that is incapable.”

1172. From 2006, a number of local militias and neighbourhood watches began

co‑operating with the MNF in Baghdad and Anbar province, acting as additional security

forces in the fight against AQ‑I. They were known originally as “Concerned Local

Citizens” and subsequently as the “Sons of Iraq” (described in more detail in Section

9.6). In a report to Congress, the DoD stated:

“The Sons of Iraq are a key component of the counterinsurgency fight due to

their knowledge of the local populace and their ability to report activity that might

otherwise escape the attention of coalition and Iraqi forces.”1103

1173. On 25 April 2007, an eGram from Mr Asquith reported that AQ was “determined

to prove that they can still operate (against Shia and Sunni targets) and to exacerbate

sectarian violence” in Baghdad.1104 They were yet to feel the “full effect” of the Baghdad

Security Plan;1105 that was expected by the end of June.

1174. Outside Baghdad, Mr Asquith said, the success of turning the Sunni resistance

and tribal groups against AQ had been “more rapid than expected”. He reported that the

groups were confronting AQ with increasing aggression, and “whereas previously the

whole eastern aspect of [Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province] was AQ controlled, this

is now reduced to a few blocks”.

1175. Mr Asquith wrote that Emergency Response Units had been established to help

maintain security, with three units in Ramadi so far and a further 14 planned later in the

year. There was also local appetite for the creation of similar resistance groups in other

regions; the Baghdad district of Abu Ghraib had seen around 1,200 individuals reporting

for recruitment in a single weekend.

1176. On 22 April, it was agreed at the MCNS that Prime Minister Maliki would chair a

group (to include MNF‑I) to determine what the Iraqi Government would be prepared to

offer to opposition and resistance groups in exchange for renouncing violence.1106

1103 Report to Congress, 7 March 2008, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.

1104 eGram 16933/07 Baghdad to FCO, 25 April 2007, ‘Iraq: Scenesetter for Visit by Secretary of State for

Defence, 30 April’.

1105 The Baghdad Security Plan is also referred to as Operation Fardh al‑Qanoon, Arabic for ‘Enforce the

Rule of Law’. It is described in greater detail in Section 9.5.

1106 eGram 16933/07 Baghdad to FCO, 25 April 2007, ‘Iraq: Scenesetter for Visit by Secretary of State for

Defence, 30 April’.

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