3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
19.
Sir David
stated that Mr Blair believed:
“… that if
Saddam Hussein intends to disarm voluntarily, and comply with
successive
UN
resolutions, he should be ready to co-operate fully in each of
these categories.
The Prime
Minister also believes that public opinion would see these five
demands
as clear
and fair tests of Saddam Hussein’s intentions, and ones that can
quickly
be met.”
20.
In a further
conversation late on 9 March, President Lagos and Mr Blair
discussed
21.
Mr Blair
agreed that they should check that Dr Blix “did not think the
tests were
unreasonable”.
If the tests showed that Saddam Hussein was serious
about
co-operation,
the tests could be followed by a timetable leading to disarmament.
The
proposal
was “halfway between setting out a detailed time schedule now,
which the US
would not
agree, and the current situation with its lack of definition of
full co-operation”.
22.
Mr Blair
also raised the possibility of pushing back the deadline to 24
March, “though
he had not
raised this with the US”.
23.
Mr Blair
told President Lagos that:
“… he
thought we had eight votes. If Mexico and Chile could support the
resolution
on the
basis of these proposals there would be enormous pressure on
Saddam, and
it would be
possible that France/Russia would not veto.”
24.
President
Lagos agreed the approach was worth exploring, but he would want
to
see changes
to the wording of the draft ultimatum and an additional
week.
25.
On 9 March,
Ms Clare Short, the International Development
Secretary,
declared
she would resign if the UK took military action against Iraq
without
UN authority.
26.
In an
interview for BBC Radio
4’s
Westminster
Hour broadcast on 9
March,
Ms Clare
Short said she would resign from the Government if the UK took
military action
against
Iraq without UN authority.8
27.
Asked whether
she thought Mr Blair had acted “recklessly”, Ms Short
described the
situation
as “extraordinarily reckless”.
28.
In response to
further questions Ms Short said:
•
“… what
worries me is that we’ve got the old spin back and we have
detailed
discussions
either personally or in the Cabinet and then the spin the next day
is:
‘we’re
ready for war’.”
7
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 9 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation
with Lagos, 9 March’.
8
BBC
News, 10 March
2003, Clare Short
interview [extracts]. [Link to
full interview no longer available.]
405