4.4 | The
search for WMD
SIS/DIS
effort and “seek to harness ISG capabilities to joint operational
objectives once
the ISG was
up and running”. The “surge effort” should last until the end of
July, when
SIS would
take stock.
368.
SIS3 reported
that co-ordination between UK agencies and units and
between
UK bodies
and their US counterparts was impressive. The task now was to
develop
a coherent
and comprehensive strategy and methodology that also
encompassed
CENTCOM and
the ISG.
369.
Mr Blair
informed Cabinet on 19 June that the ISG had started
systematic work
on
uncovering Iraqi programmes for WMD.178
No further
discussion of the issue
was recorded.
370.
Mr Howard
sent Mr Bowen a progress report on
20 June.179
It was now
clear that
Mr Tenet
would exercise strategic oversight of the ISG’s work on WMD and
would be
represented
in Iraq by Dr Kay. Maj Gen Dayton had been tasked to support Dr
Kay.
The ISG
would continue to work within the military chain of command to
ensure it
received
the necessary security, logistics and life support. There was
evidence that
CENTCOM was
now giving the ISG the support it needed.
371.
Mr Howard
reported that, during calls on SIS and the DIS on 19 June, Dr
Kay had
stressed
the importance he attached to the ISG being an intelligence-led
operation and
the need
for an accelerated timetable.
372.
Mr Howard
also enclosed the first ISG situation report from Brig
Deverell,
Maj Gen
Dayton’s Deputy, who reported that the main components of the ISG
were
now functional
and that the first operations would take place later in the
week.180
373.
Baroness
Symons, Minister of State for the Middle East, explained the ISG’s
lines
of
accountability to London and Washington in the House of Lords on
16 October:
“… the Iraq
Survey Group (ISG) is not part of the Coalition Provisional
Authority.
It is
part of the United States-led military forces in Iraq and is
therefore accountable
to the
United States Administration. British personnel seconded to the
Survey Group
are under
the tactical control of the United States’ commander. They are
under
the
operational command of and accountable to the United Kingdom Chief
of Joint
Operations
and thus to Her Majesty’s Government. On reporting, the findings
of
the Group
are available to the Coalition partners, including our own
Intelligence
and
Security Committee, which will have access to the full text of the
ISG
178
Cabinet
Conclusions, 19 June 2003.
179
Letter
Howard to Bowen, 20 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Iraq Survey Group and
Related
Issues: Progress Report’.
180
Report
Deverell to CDI, 18 June 2003, ‘Iraq Survey Group Sitrep No.1
18 Jun 03’.
181
House of
Lords, Official
Report,
16 October 2003, column 1095.
493