4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
536.
The
Requirements officer concluded that SIS should write to those to
whom the
reports had
been issued and sought SIS3 and SIS4 approval for the text to be
used.
537.
The
Requirements officer also commented:
“… there
are still unanswered questions as to how this story could have been
so
wrong, but
that is not an issue for CX readers.”
538.
Sir Richard
Dearlove informed the ISC in mid-July 2003 that the intelligence
had
539.
Internal SIS
documents seen by the Inquiry show that the briefing produced for
Sir
Richard
Dearlove’s appearance before the ISC stated that: “In the light of
the post-war
research …
[the reporting of 11 and 23 September 2002] has now been
withdrawn.”200
540.
A memorandum
withdrawing the reports of 3 April 2003 (and 11 and
23 September
2002) was issued on 29 July 2003.201
It said
that SIS had interviewed the
individual
identified as the sub-source for the intelligence after the
conflict, but he had
denied
being the source of the material passed to SIS. The memorandum
stated that the
reports
were being withdrawn because the sourcing chain was discredited.
That did “not
necessarily
invalidate their contents (some of which chimed with other
reporting)”.
541.
The memorandum
was sent to most of the recipients of the original
reports,
including
to the Private Offices of Mr Straw and Mr Hoon and to
Mr Bowen in the Cabinet
Office. But
it was not sent to No.10 or to Mr Brown’s Private
Office.
542.
In the
covering letter to SIS’s Annual Report for 2002-2003,
Sir Richard Dearlove
wrote:
“Iraq of
course has been the dominant issue. I am confident that the
intelligence
picture to
which we contributed pre-conflict will be proved
correct.”202
543.
Sir Richard
added that the search for Saddam Hussein’s WMD would
continue
into 2004,
“and possibly beyond”. He also wrote:
“We risk
damage to the credibility of the intelligence community if the
public
perception
remains that our intelligence may have been wrong. If we can
persuade
Iraqi
scientists involved in the programme to go public, then we may be
able to turn
the media
debate more in our favour and reduce our dependence on the
eventual
outcome of
the physical search.”
544.
In the letter
and the Annual Report itself, which was sent to Mr Brown,
Mr Straw
and
Mr Hoon, Sir Andrew Turnbull, Sir David Omand,
Mr Scarlett, Sir Michael Jay (the
199
Letter PS/C
to Adams, 8 September 2003, ‘Additional ISC Request for Access to
Intelligence’.
200
SIS record,
July 2003, ‘Briefing for C appearance at ISC’.
201
Minute [SIS
memorandum], 29 July 2003, [with telegram and memorandum of same
date].
202
Letter
Dearlove to Prime Minister, 30 July 2003, ‘SIS Annual Report
2002-2003’.
385