3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
•
“renounce
all involvement with terrorism and permit no terrorist
organisations to
operate in
Iraq”; and
•
“destroy
and stop developing all weapons of mass destruction and long
range
missiles
and to prove to the world it has done so by complying with
rigorous
inspection”.
543.
President Bush
set out Iraq’s failure to meet those obligations. Iraq had
“broken
every
aspect” of the last pledge, including:
•
“Right now,
Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for
the
production
of biological weapons.”
•
UN inspections
had revealed that Iraq “likely maintains stockpiles of VX,
mustard
and other
chemical agents, and that the regime is rebuilding and
expanding
facilities
capable of producing chemical weapons”.
•
Iraq
continued “to withhold important information about its nuclear
program”;
employed
“capable nuclear scientists and technicians”; and retained
“the
physical
infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon”. It had “made
several
attempts to
buy high‑strength aluminium tubes used to enrich uranium for
a
nuclear
weapon”. If Iraq acquired fissile material, “it would be able to
build a
nuclear
weapon within a year”.
•
Iraq’s
“state controlled media” had “reported numerous meetings
between
Saddam
Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about
his
continued
appetite for these weapons”.
•
Iraq also
possessed “a force” of SCUD‑type missiles with greater than
permitted
range and
was “building more … that can inflict mass death throughout
the
region”.
•
Iraq had
“subverted” the OFF programme “to buy missile technology and
military
materials”.
•
Despite the
UN’s demands for the return of inspectors, Iraq had had
“four
years …
to plan and to build and to test behind the cloak of
secrecy”.
544.
Challenging
the United Nations to act, President Bush stated:
“We know
that Saddam Hussein pursued weapons of mass murder even
when
inspectors
were in his country. Are we to assume that he stopped when they
left?
The
history, the logic and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam
Hussein’s
regime is a
grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope
against
the
evidence. To assume … good faith is … a reckless gamble … [T]his is
a risk we
must not
take.
“We have
been more than patient … Saddam Hussein has defied all these
efforts
and
continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we
may be
completely
certain he has … nuclear weapons is when … he uses one. We owe it
to
all our
citizens to prevent that day from coming.
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