The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
6.
As described
in Sections 6.4 and 6.5, the UK’s pre-invasion planning and
preparation
for its
role in the Occupation of Iraq was not sufficient to deliver these
ambitious
objectives,
in part because the UK had placed a great deal of reliance on
planning
by the
US, as the lead member of the Coalition.
7.
Many of the
difficulties which the Coalition encountered after the successful
military
campaign
had been, or could have been, foreseen. After facing those
difficulties during
his
six-month posting in Baghdad, in March 2004 Sir Jeremy Greenstock
concluded:
“The
preparations for the post-conflict stage were abject; wrong
analysis, wrong
8.
The UK hoped
that, once the fighting had ceased, the UN would take a leading
role
in the
reconstruction operation, including the establishment of an Iraqi
Government,
facilitating
the arrival of resources from the international community and in
particular
from
nations which had not contributed to the military
Coalition.
9.
The UK
recognised that it would have responsibility for the area of
southern Iraq
controlled
by its forces. It aspired to manage the post-conflict response in
that region in
such a way
that it would be considered “exemplary” in relation to the rest of
Iraq, drawing
on
resources provided by other nations.
10.
Although
officials had warned that knowledge of conditions within Iraq
was
incomplete,
it was assumed that Iraq would have a functioning civil service,
criminal
justice
system and security forces which, after the removal of Ba’athist
leadership, would
all play
their part in its reconstruction.
11.
After the
invasion force had rapidly brought down Saddam Hussein’s regime,
the
UK’s
six-year engagement in Iraq fell into three broad phases, which the
Inquiry has
used to
provide a simplified framework for describing events:
•
Occupation
– March 2003 to June 2004: during
which the UK was formally a
joint
Occupying Power alongside the US, and Iraq was governed by the
US-led
Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA);
•
Transition
– June 2004 to the end of 2005: characterised
by the increasing
power of
Iraqi politicians and institutions, and ending with elections and
the
formation
of the Maliki Government; and
•
Preparation
for withdrawal – 2006 to 2009: during
which period the
UK sought
to transfer its remaining responsibilities in
Multi-National
Division
(South‑East) (MND(SE)) to Iraqi forces so that it could
withdraw
its remaining troops.
3
Telegram
109 IraqRep to FCO London, 26 March 2004, ‘Iraq Valedictory: Six
Months in the Cauldron’.
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