The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

126. Sir Michael Wood disagreed with Mr Pattison’s conclusion:

“This is not so. I set out the arguments as fairly as I could, taking full account of

extensive comments from UKMIS New York.”41

127. Sir Michael wrote in his statement:

“I was instructed … that the Foreign Secretary was content for me to send the letter

provided I did not include in the letter a statement of my own view of the law; and

provided that I made it clear in the letter that no advice was needed at present.

I was not happy with these instructions …

“There are broadly two ways for a departmental lawyer to consult the Attorney: by

setting out the different possibilities, without expressing a view; or, and this is much

more common and usually more helpful, by setting out the differing possibilities

and giving a view. In the present case, I was instructed to do the former, though the

Attorney was anyway well aware of my views.”

128. In the final version of the “instructions” for Lord Goldsmith, Mr Wood wrote:

“No advice is required now. Any decisions in the future would clearly need to take

account of all the circumstances, including any further deliberation in the Security

Council.”42

129. In his statement for the Inquiry, Lord Goldsmith wrote that he had been told that it

was the view of Mr Straw that the instructions of 9 December should make clear that no

advice was needed at that time.43

130. The Inquiry sought the views of a number of witnesses about whether Lord

Goldsmith’s advice should have been available at an earlier stage.

131. In his statement to the Inquiry, Sir Michael Wood wrote that he did not agree with

Mr Straw’s view that advice was not needed until later:

“While it may not have been essential to have advice at that time, it was in my view

highly desirable … FCO Legal Advisers were in a very uncomfortable position …

We were having to advise on whether SCR 1441 authorised the use of force without

a further decision of the Security Council without the benefit of the Attorney’s advice.

It would have been possible for the Attorney to have given advice on the meaning

of SCR 1441 soon after its adoption, since all the relevant considerations were then

known, though that advice would no doubt have had to be kept under review in the

light of developments.”44

41 Statement, 15 March 2011, page 19.

42 Letter Wood to Adams, 9 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002)’.

43 Statement, 17 January 2011, paragraph 1.12.

44 Statement, 15 March 2011, page 20.

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